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During the winter of 2012, my father got seriously and complicatedly ill. During his 
hospitalizations, the experience of being a family carer with medical knowledge was at times 
upsetting. I was emotionally shaken, and for two months, I could not concentrate on reading 
or writing. I lacked the intellectual strength to pull the thesis together. I am conscious that I 
leave the reader with some fragments and loose ends. Sadly, my father was at times treated 
exactly the way I discuss at the end, like a disorder. The worthy meeting with a doctor that in 
a glimpse recognized him as a person and us as a family and made his clinical decision 








Summary of thesis 
The core of medicine, even specialized and high-tech medicine, is a meeting, a consultation, 
between a human being asking for advice and another human being, whose knowledge and 
experience is expected to be helpful. This thesis explores how the suspicion of cancer can 
arise in such a consultation, how general practitioners (GPs) can contribute to cancer care and 
how GPs might accompany people with cancer towards the end of life.  
 
25 qualitative interviews with Norwegian GPs about diagnosing and attending people with 
cancer through the course of illness were analyzed. Besides clinical assessments and 
paperwork, the GPs often acted as intermediaries between the patient and the hospital. They 
pushed for quick hospital appointments, interpreted and translated discharge letters and were 
asked for second opinions. In rural areas some GPs offered cytostatic treatments. Knowing the 
patient and preferably also the family was seen as a premise for being a good GP. In the 
researcher’s interpretation, the GPs were well acquainted both with the patients’ world and 
with the clinical world. They could act as guides for their patients, but their personal 
knowledge of patients could, even if it was clinically relevant, be given less weight when 
confronted with hospital routines and criteria. This could lead to conflicting loyalties for the 
GPs. During end-of-life care in the patients’ homes, existential conversations were seen as 
demanding but rewarding. Palliation of pain was an easy task compared to being a fellow 





Avhandlingen tar utgangspunkt i at kjernen i medisin, selv i spesialisert og høyteknologisk 
medisin, er et møte mellom mennesker: Et som søker råd og et annet som har nødvendig 
kunnskap og erfaring. Avhandlingen undersøker hvordan mistanken om kreft kan oppstå i et 
slikt møte, hva fastleger kan bidra når folk får kreft og hvilke utfordringer de ser når de følger 
noen med langkommet kreft mot livets slutt.  
 
Forskeren analyserte i alt 25 kvalitative intervju med norske allmennleger. De fortalte om 
pasienter de hadde fulgt gjennom et sykdomsforløp. Ved siden av kliniske vurderinger og 
papirarbeid var de ofte formidlere mellom pasienten og sykehuset. De ble spurt om 
behandlingsråd, tolket og oversatte brev fra sykehuset, og var pådrivere for kortere ventetid. I 
distrikt ga noen også cellegiftkurer. Det å kjenne pasienten og gjerne også familien ble sett på 
som en forutsetning for å være en god lege. Forskeren oppfattet allmennlegene som 
lokalkjente både i pasientens verden og i den kliniske verden. Dette var en styrke overfor 
pasientene, men i forhold til sykehuset kunne fastlegens nærkunnskap bli oppfattet som 
mindre viktig enn systemets rutiner og kriterier. Det kunne føre til lojalitetskonflikter for 
allmennlegene. I omsorgen hjemme hos pasienten ved livets slutt var eksistensielle spørsmål 
både krevende og givende. Å lindre smerter var enklere enn å være et lyttende og trøstende 
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The General Practitioner (GP) is the only doctor that ideally could accompany the individual 
person with cancer through the whole course of illness. GPs often know people before they 
know what their illnesses will be. GPs claim to be committed to persons, who should feel 
assured that they will not be abandoned by their GP, whatever may befall them (McWhinney, 
2000). However, the diagnosis and treatment of cancer is connected to a highly specialized 
part of medicine, dependent on a sophisticated use of technology. The association between 
cancer and technology is pictured at the cover of British Journal of General Practice’s cancer-
issue (Nov 2011), showing a person on a stretcher and a health worker, both standing in a blue 
light outside the shining circular opening of a scanning machine. The connection to general 
practice is not obvious in such a technological image of cancer care. GPs might loose the 
contact with their patients with cancer during the treatment period, a notion that is captured in 
the title: “When patients have cancer, they stop seeing me” (Anvik et al., 2006). However, the 
article also refer to patients who had follow-up by their GPs during and after cancer 
treatment, and who appreciated being taken care of as ‘a whole person’, with their anxiety and 
worries, pains and side-effects, concomitant illnesses and issues of family and work.  
 
A Danish study (Aabom & Pfeiffer, 2009) explored this further: Why are some patients in 
treatment for advanced cancer reluctant to consult their GP? They interviewed people 
receiving chemotherapy in an oncological outpatient clinic, and found that patients developed 
a personal relationship with and dependency to the staff at this centre. They consulted the 
doctor there rather than their own GP. Some patients thought the GP did not know enough 
about cancer treatment, or that the GP was too busy. As the disease progressed; patients had 
more psychosocial needs, which were unmet at the cancer centre. The authors concluded that 
special attention is needed to get the GP involved again during and after cancer treatment, to 
ensure a good passage to home-based end-of-life care.  
 
Almost every person in Norway is registered with a GP for primary healthcare. Most GPs 
work as self-employed, in group practices, contracted and granted by the municipalities. 
Patients need referral from GPs to see specialists, which makes GPs important gatekeepers in 
the health care system. Out-of-hours, primary care is organized by the municipalities, 
engaging local GPs according to a roster. There is no formal agreement about the distribution 
of tasks related to cancer between hospitals and primary care, and there are local variations. 
Regional centres for competence in palliative care provide training, advice and guidelines. 
District nurses and, in some areas, cancer nurses are employed by the municipalities, not 
directly by general practices. Palliative home care is not yet fully developed in Norway, and 
home death has been less common than in other countries. In 2003, the percentage of cancer 
related deaths occurring at home was 45 in the Netherlands, 28 in Belgium, 23 in England and 
only 13 in Norway (Cohen et al., 2010).   
 
GPs are not experts of cancer, but claim to be experts of meeting people who have any 
common illness, included cancer, or who fear that they have it. GPs could be key persons for 
the professional interaction around a person suffering from cancer, but often they are not. 
Some GPs do not engage in palliative care, and a few don’t do home visits at all. In Norway, a 
new health care reform places more responsibility in the municipalities, especially for people 
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with chronic illnesses. Palliative treatment and end-of-life care should if possible be given in 
the patient’s home or in a local nursing home. Are GPs prepared for this? In a survey to GPs 
in the Norwegian county of Vestfold, 73% of respondents said they would take medical 
responsibility for people with cancer who wanted to die at home, but only a minority valued 
their competence in pain relief as good enough (von Hanno, 2000). Anvik et al (2006) 
concluded that most GPs in their interview study were prepared to take a more responsible 
role for people with cancer. The GPs found ways of obtaining the knowledge they lacked, and 
encouraged a closer cooperation with specialists, especially around the patient’s discharge 
from in-patient care. These were so far the only studies in Norway asking GPs about their 
work cancer care. In face of the Norwegian health care reform, and also the establishment of 
palliative teams in many communities, the GPs’ roles during the course of a cancer illness are 
in transformation. There is a need for investigating GPs’ possible contribution to health care 
for persons with cancer.  
 
Theoretical considerations 
Cancer is challenging medicine to show its full potential; mobilizing an enormous effort to 
search for ways of curing, and likewise calling for medicine’s utmost caring capabilities. 
Before looking specifically into a possible contribution of general practice in the face of 
cancer, we should consider the basic question: What is medicine? According to Pellegrino 
(1979), medicine is a relationship, a ‘specific and unique kind of human relationship’, 
between a doctor (or another clinician) and a patient. Toulmin (1976) asserts that the patient 
begins and ends as a sufferer, the physician begins and ends as his personal adviser, and the 
most particular unit in medicine is ‘the individuality of the relationship between the patient 
and his personal physician’. Given this ontological basis of medicine, biomedical science 
becomes ‘only a means to be pursued for the sake of the good that physicians can do to 
particular patients’ (Toulmin, 1976:41). The complex challenges that confront doctors in their 
daily work and their resulting experience and understanding will according to Toulmin range 
‘far beyond the boundaries of science’ (Toulmin, 1976:49). 
 
Hunter (1991) also holds that medicine is a moral enterprise whose goal is to alleviate 
suffering. Hunter suggests that the diagnosis of disease is a relatively simple matter compared 
to the care of the patient. She characterizes medicine as the exercise of practical wisdom in 
the face of uncertainty, and holds that medicine’s identification with science has led to 
adverse effects for patients, doctors and for the doctor-patient relationship. ‘It encourages 
physicians and patients alike to focus narrowly on the diagnosis of disease rather than attend 
to what is even more necessary, the care of the person who is ill’ (Hunter, 1991:xix). She also 
claims that ‘the idealization of medicine as science offers physicians preparation and support 
for only a part of their task’ (Hunter 1991:25). Malterud (1995) claims that if medicine is 
defined by knowledge from biomedical science alone, its epistemology fails to include the 
human interaction and interpretation constituting clinical practice. This is often called the art 
of medicine, which in Malterud’s opinion is mystifying, and due to ‘a provisional lack of 
visualization, articulation and documentation’ (1995:189). She suggests that if the clinical 
encounter constitutes medicine, as many authors claim, the specific knowledge generated 
from this encounter should be a part of the epistemology of medicine: Knowledge about 
human interaction, clinical judgment and reasoning, and clinical philosophy (Malterud, 1995).  
 
General practice is community based and accessible; offers continuity, a personal doctor-
patient relationship and uses little technology. This favours another perspective on medicine 
than being hospital based, highly specialized and technologically advanced (Rudebeck, 1991). 
General practice claims to be the only discipline defining itself through relationships, 
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especially the doctor-patient relationship (McWhinney, 1996). GPs tend to think about 
individual patients rather than generalized abstractions. They often have difficulties separating 
diseases from the people they care for who have them, even to talk about general practice 
without speaking about their patients is difficult. This is, according to McWhinney, due to 
close doctor-patient relationships, giving a fuller knowledge of the person as particular, and, 
crucial for caring. Caring doctors should walk hand-in-hand with their patients through the 
landscape of illness, said McWhinney, challenging the imbalance of intellectual and 
emotional development in medical education. The cumulative knowledge of a long-term 
relationship could give the GP great advantages; every new event could be understood in the 
context of a life story. The relationship to patients could open up a rich experience of life and 
medicine to GPs, but to achieve this, GPs have to be very good at relationships (McWhinney, 
1996).  
 
A person going to the doctor has already been through an interpretative process (Leder, 
1990b). Normally, human beings do not actively perceive the body; we are one with and at 
home in our bodies. Or as Merleau-Ponty (1962) wrote:’ The body is the vehicle of being in 
the world’ (p. 82). When a symptom appears, we might feel torn out of this immediate 
relation (Rudebeck, 1991) and the body might stand out as a separate entity. The wholeness 
and homeliness can be lost (Svenaeus, 2000b). Humans do not only have a biological 
anatomy, but also an existential anatomy, expressed through the meaning each bodily part has 
in life. Feet, for example, mean standing and walking, keeping our balance, basing our 
existence, giving us autonomy and freedom of movement (Rudebeck, 1991). Thus, bodily 
experiences are referring to two levels of meaning, the physical body and the meaning of the 
body in human life. Symptoms can arise from both levels, and will always affect the other 
level. The biological anatomy can be compared with the cover, paper and ink of a book. They 
are necessary physical conditions, but the lived body, the body in its context of life, adds the 
story to the book. This can seem self-evident in our daily lives, but in scientific thought, self 
and body has been disconnected for several hundred years. The phenomenological concept of 
the lived body can help doctors understand their patients’ presentation of bodily experiences.  
 
The patient’s story is, even if it is adapted to the medical context, primarily a story about the 
existential aspects of the lived body, about the existential anatomy. The doctor most often 
listens with the biomedical map of the physical body in mind. As Rudebeck (1991) notes, a 
question of validity arises: Are patient and doctor talking about the same things? Rudebeck 
recommends that the doctor attends fully to the patient from the moment of silence that opens 
the consultation (Rudebeck, 2002).‘Before deciding whether biomedical understanding and 
measures are applicable at all, the doctor has to grasp the basic character of experience 
presented’(Rudebeck, 1991:31). In understanding the experiences of the lived bodies of 
others, doctors can use their own lived bodies as reference. Rudebeck suggests that the 
capacity to understand another person’s bodily experiences is called bodily empathy. It is an 
aspect of general empathy; the interpretative imagination and intersubjective connectedness 
that makes human beings capable of understanding each other. In the use of bodily empathy, 
says Rudebeck, there is no split between relating to the patient and making a diagnosis. On 
the contrary, ‘diagnosis is promoted by the accurate apprehension of the symptom 
presentation’ (Rudebeck, 2002).  
 
The Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom, phronesis, might be useful for understanding 
clinical judgment. Phronesis is ‘an ability to apply general or universal knowledge to 
particular situations, to see what a unique and particular situation calls for. Phronesis is the 
rationality for action’(Gatens-Robinson, 1986:174). In clinical judgment, the practical task is 
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to understand what a given situation requires. To ascertain what is required a wide range of 
knowledge and skills are involved. Gatens-Robinson explains that ‘the general becomes a way 
to understand the particular case and the particular case becomes a way of showing how the 
general could be better put’. She claims that in this hermeneutic situation, neither induction 
nor deduction is applied, but dialogue: The knowledge of the particular arises in a dialogue 
‘of well-placed questions and their revealing answers’ (1986:175). To be skilled for this 
dialogue, the doctor needs many kinds of knowledge. Since persons are temporal subjects, 
knowledge of their history is essential for understanding. Therefore, the rationality of clinical 
judgment is both dialogical and narrative (1986).  
 
Hermeneutics for Gatens-Robinson (1986) is not a methodological but an ontological concept. 
Searching for understanding and meaning are fundamental aspects of being human. In 
medicine, this search primarily takes place in a meeting; the clinical encounter. Even if the 
meeting is asymmetrical in powers, it is a search for a shared understanding, through 
dialogue. Both the dialogue and the clinical examination might deal with intimate matters, 
which are normally only revealed to very close persons, or maybe not at all. A shared 
understanding is not possible without a shared language, both verbal and non-verbal, and a 
mutual attunement, both cognitive and an emotional, which is reached through empathy 
(Svenaeus, 2000a). Empathy is necessary for understanding another person from a moral 
point of view (Gadamer, 1979). To understand, in the sense of being able to give advice, 
means ‘to realize the full moral situation of the other’ (1979:74). This means to understand 
the deeper meaning of the illness within the unique life story of a person. Understanding both 
the person and the illness on this level requires ‘the subjective knowledge which comes from 
empathy and understanding of that symbolic language in which feelings are often expressed’ 
(McWhinney, 1978). The most essential step in a clinical encounter is formulating and 
understanding the patient’s problems, and this ‘depends above all else on the quality of the 
relationship established between patient and doctor’ (McWhinney, 1978:299). 
 
How does the doctor think, when relating to the patient and simultaneously trying to solve a 
clinical problem? According to Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing, humans have an intention 
to unify perceived particulars into a larger, coherent pattern. The part is merged into the whole 
by integration. Human attention has a focal awareness on the whole, e.g. a face, a melody, a 
diagnosis, and a subsidiary awareness on the parts; the features, the sounds, the signs (Jha, 
2002). Human actions occur along a continuum between bodily and conceptual poles. Bodily 
and subsidiary poles combine to form tacit knowing. Intuition mediates between the focal and 
subsidiary poles; it brings knowledge from the subsidiary pole into the focal and conceptual 
realm (Polanyi, 1969). We cannot have explicit knowledge without a tacit background. All 
our knowing is grounded in tacit knowing (Polanyi, 1983). According to Polanyi, we can 
know another person’s explicit thoughts only through words, but we can have a subsidiary 
awareness of the other’s tacit thoughts, through comprehending their bodily gestures and 
expressions. This knowledge is tacit both for the knower and for the other person (Polanyi, 
1997).  
 
Applying this theory on clinical reasoning, the doctor-patient relationship has to be included 
as part of the diagnostic process. The physician, a human being, can understand the patient as 
another human being, through an active emphatic stance. Approaching the patient as a person, 
the doctor’s clinical knowledge will be in subsidiary awareness, and will along with tacitly 
perceived cues contribute to the initial diagnostic hypotheses. Without this human-to-human 
understanding of the patients’ experience, through bodily expressions and spoken words, the 
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doctor can miss important tacit cues for the medical task of diagnosis and treatment, and run 
the risk of detachment from the patient (Jha, 2002).   
 
In the more analytic phase of clinical problem solving, the patient as a case is in focal 
awareness and the patient as an existential being is in subsidiary awareness. The focus will be 
shifting several times during the process. According to Polanyi, it is not possible to attend to 
both to the biological body and to the existential person at the same moment; one cannot have 
two foci of attention simultaneously. However, in subsidiary awareness one can have several 
aspects. The diagnostic process is a shifting between analysis and integration, successively 
until the problem is solved. Integration means that when turning to curing or healing, both the 
patient-as-person and the patient-as-case can be in subsidiary awareness, and the patient as 
embodied mind can be in focal awareness (Jha, 2002). 
 
For Pellegrino (1979), the experience of illness is the most important fact in medicine, 
manifesting a basic human need to be healed. To be healed is to have the experience of 
integrity and wholeness; the unity of self and body restored. This restoration may in case of 
chronic illness ‘represent a renegotiation, a newly struck balance, between the self’s hopes 
and the body’s capacities’ (Thomasma, 1997) p. 177. The word patient has its Latin roots in 
the word patior, meaning to suffer, undergo, experience, while the word profession origins 
from the Latin word profiteor, which means to declare aloud and publicly, to promise. ‘The 
physician is a health professional by virtue of her promise to bring her knowledge, skill and 
experience to bear on the fulfilment of the patient’s ontological need for healing’ (1997:178). 
Pellegrino also holds that clinical expertise is about phronesis, practical wisdom, about 
experience in ‘bridging that epistemological and ontological gap between the abstract, 
general, and objective laws and rules of biomedical science and the concrete particularity of 
the individual patient’ (1997:183).   
 
Hunter (1991) also sees restoration as the goal of medicine. Se reminds us that although it is 
often useful in research to isolate a part of the body and attend to it without reference to the 
whole, this reductionist procedure is not the essence of clinical medicine. If the diseased 
organ is seen as isolated, this cannot lead to reliable therapy. ‘To move toward ameliorating 
the patient’s condition, the part must be recontextualized, considered again as a part of the 
whole (1991:10). Kleinman (1988) suggests a practical clinical methodology for the care of 
the chronically ill, wherein the essential words are empathic listening, translation and 
interpretation. He compares the clinician to an ethnographer, who ‘practices an intensive, 
systematic, and imaginative empathy with the experiences and modes of thought of persons 
who may be foreign to him (…)’ The purpose is ‘for the clinician to place himself in the lived 


















On this theoretical background, I will review the empirical research most relevant for our 
study. At the end of each section, a summary which points towards our research questions will 
be provided. 
 
International studies of GPs’ work in cancer care 
In cancer care, GPs face several dilemmas (Rosser & Maguire, 1982). Being trained in 
biomedicine, GPs’ hand luggage is a medicine aiming to be an objective, physical science, 
claiming the mastery of natural processes through interventions and dividing strictly between 
psyche and soma. GPs are located at the juncture between this knowledge of disease and their 
patients’ experience of illness and social suffering. They are aware of the uncertainties and 
limitations of biomedical knowledge, but also of their own limited knowledge of a particular 
condition compared to a specialist. A reaction to the rise of hospital medicine and the 
consequent fall in status for general practice was the emerging in the 1950s of biographical 
medicine, which saw the role of the GP as a ‘final arbiter’ of patients’ care, ‘interpreting, 
modifying, translating and sometimes even rejecting the specialist advice’(Armstrong, 1979). 
Knowledge should not be seen only as stored in a hospital, but also as contained in the act of 
general practice. Thus, two perspectives of medicine were co-existing: 1) The application of 
science to the human body in order to combat disease 2) Care of the individual by attending to 
the biography and the subjective experience of the sufferer. GPs had both perspectives; and in 
cancer care, they could conflict (Rosser & Maguire, 1982). In the first perspective, the 
specialist is the final authority on management, and GPs have a subordinate status. The 
interviewed GPs (1982) told about several incidents when they felt that their patients were 
undergoing futile treatment which seemed harmful. Still, the GPs generally did not feel in the 
position to openly question this treatment. From the second perspective, the patient’s 
experience is decisive, and the GP’s primary obligation is to relieve suffering. Thus the GP 
also had a specific role, which was cooperative, and not subordinate, to the specialist’s role. 
For the interviewed GPs (1982), telling patients about their incurable disease was 
embarrassing, because it was seen as a defeat both for medicine and for the GP. GPs’ 
ideology of holistic caring would require an advanced understanding of reactions to disease 
and illness, which was poorly accounted for in medical theory. The attempts of GPs to 
provide comprehensive care would therefore remain fraught with problems stemming from 
their position at a crucial juncture in health care, both conceptually and structurally (1982). 
For our study, the notion of GPs’ place at a juncture between biomedicine and their patients’ 
life world, GPs’ subordination to specialists and the attention to lack of theory for a holistic 
patient care, were important contributions.  
 
Still and Todd (1986) picked up the thread from Rosser and Maguire, stating that the conflict 
the latter authors refer to can be seen as an ambiguity between two roles for the doctor. In the 
sociological literature, a sick role (Parsons, 1951) and a dying role (Noyes & Clancy, 1983) of 
the patient have been compared with a curative role and a caring role of the doctor, 
respectively. Both Parsons and Noyes & Clancy saw the cure of the sick as the primary role 
for the doctor. The latter assert that society reserves this more important function for the 
physician, and ‘guards against inroads upon the physician’s time and energy’ (Noyes & 
Clancy, 1983). The project of Still and Todd (1986) was to explore through interviews the 
role for the doctor when the patient is not being cured, but is going to die. They found that the 
GPs shared common beliefs and attitudes towards their dying patients, like wanting to treat 
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the patients at home and aiming to give them freedom of pain. The GPs told their patients that 
they were dying only if the patients asked directly, but the GPs varied in their tendency to 
encourage such questions. They thought that patients had to be told carefully and gradually, to 
make them accept the dying role and not start a search for miracle cures. More than half of the 
GPs found care of the dying demanding, but rewarding, while a quarter found it just 
demanding, without any rewards.  
 
Still and Todd found that the GPs’ attitudes revolved around two ideal types: A technically 
equipped curative agent complimenting the patient’s sick role and a caring role 
complimenting the patient’s dying role. The latter involved guiding the patient through the 
transition from sick to dying role, and then giving palliative care, both physical and 
psychological support. This role needed social rather than technical skills, involved the doctor 
emotionally and attended to both the patient and the family. In the caring role, the GP 
continued to be of primary importance to the patient, as part of a team including nurses and 
family carers (Still & Todd, 1986). The scripts for roles and ideal types were evolving with 
social change, so that at any one time they might be in a stable or in a transitional state. Still 
and Todd assumed that the caring role for the doctor was in a transitional state, resulting in a 
role ambiguity which would explain why the doctors in their study varied so much in their 
attitudes towards dying patients. Moreover, they presumed that the doctors who did not find 
care for dying rewarding had not yet internalized the caring role; instead they were influenced 
by the values of hospital medicine and university teaching. In my opinion, the caring role of 
the physician is not a modern invention; rather it is the other way round: Seeing the doctor as 
primarily a curative agent is probably connected to the success of hospital medicine during 
the last hundred years, while the caring role is as old as medicine itself, cf. the Hippocratic 
Oath.  
 
A French study (Aiach et al., 1990) did not agree with Rosser and Maguire’s analysis of GPs 
being in a juncture of dilemmas. They thought that GPs’ work towards people with cancer 
falls so fully within general medicine that it could revive GPs ‘mythical image of a practice 
consisting in devotion and compassion for a suffering world’ and make GPs rediscover the 
vocation of general medicine. Because the GP has little to do in therapy, he can be more 
personally involved. This corresponds to Still and Todd’s caring role. Aiach et al found that 
GPs had a conception of general practice opposed to medicine as only a technical quest to 
cure the patient, and that the GPs took their patients’ psychological and social characteristics 
into account. The theoretical contribution of the study was a model for the GP-patient 
relationship which the authors call a confidence-assistance pact. The GP makes a commitment 
to handle the patient’s case, be by his side and help him cope, while the patient accepts to 
fully trust the physician. The reasons for a GP’s decision to handle the cancer patient’s case 
are, according to the authors, found in the GP’s self-image as a physician and as a human 
being. He has to manage the situation emotionally, socially and medically, and because 
accompanying a dying person is an extreme situation, the GP might become so deeply 
involved that he reaches his human and professional limits (Aiach et al., 1990). In the model 
of these authors, there is no explanation for the divergent views amongst GPs in the British 
studies. Maybe in France the tradition of looking at medicine as a caring practice was less 
interrupted by the success of hospital medicine than in the UK. Or maybe the caring role for 
the GP was already more stabilized by 1990. In our study, we will follow up on their notion of 
a confidence-assistance pact between the dying patient and the GP and look for a deeper 
understanding of the driving force behind GPs’ commitment to these patients, keeping in 
mind the notion of an extreme situation which pushes doctors to their limits.  
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The dilemmas outlined by Rosser and Maguire (1982) provided the rationale for an interview 
study with British GPs about their care of dying people (Field, 1998). His participants stressed 
the relational aspects of terminal care in general practice: Knowing the patients before they 
got ill, being embedded in the family and the community and being known by the patients. 
The GPs saw themselves as part of a team of health workers, not necessarily in the lead, with 
the district nurses working in closest contact with patients and family. Most GPs saw 
themselves as coordinators of care. One reason for this was that they knew the patient longer 
than anyone else involved. Psychosocial support to patients and their relatives was seen as 
important, while physical symptom management was treated as a basic and taken for granted 
aspect of care. Relationships with hospitals were variable, with complaints from the GPs 
about lack of information about patients. The GPs also expressed a worry towards the 
palliative care services, a worry of loosing control of patient care. The GPs felt that they had 
the best knowledge about the patients and their families. They welcomed the possibility to call 
palliative experts when needed, but did not want to surrender terminal care to them. All 
respondents stressed the importance of honesty to people who were dying and their families. 
The GPs had procedures for bereavement support, visiting the bereaved relative at home 
shortly after death. They generally found the work with these patients important, satisfying 
and rewarding.  Just as delivering babies, it created a very special bond with that family. 
However, the GPs did not regard their work with dying people different from their other 
work. Communicative, organisational and clinical skills were important for all their work with 
patients, just as relationship and a holistic view of the person (Field, 1998). Although Field 
does not comment on it, it seems that the dilemmas outlined by Rosser and Maguire were less 
predominant in British GPs’ work 15 years later. From other studies, we know that by 1998, 
cancer was less an enigma for biomedicine, treatment was more reliable and there was an 
emphasis on openness about the diagnosis. The GPs seemed more confident that their role 
was, in Still and Todd’s terms, a caring role, which however, demanded the whole spectre of 
clinical and professional skills. The fact that they viewed their work with dying people as 
‘special not different’ from their other work indicates that none of them were longer solely a 
‘technically equipped curative agent’. Following Still and Todd, the caring role for the GP 
might have been stabilized since their study (1986), and not only so for working with dying 
patients, but for all patients.  
 
MacLeod (2001) started out noticing that the concept of care, or how doctors learn to care, 
rarely emerge in the medical literature. He states that care is more than attending to a person’s 
needs. It is to be receptive to and responsible for others, motivated by empathy. The 
socialization of medical students and young doctors might decrease instead of augment 
empathy. Presupposing that caring was not learnt at medical school, MacLeod sets out to 
interview doctors, from internal medicine, general practice and palliative medicine, about how 
they learned to care for people who are dying. The participants confirmed that they did not 
learn it at school. The doctors learned the caring of dying people in an intimate and emotional 
way, from the dying people themselves. As dying people are vulnerable and helpless, they 
might engender feelings of helplessness and vulnerability in the doctor. Only when doctors 
accept their vulnerability and are able to express and share it without fear of being judged, 
they can learn to live with this tension (MacLeod, 2001). The study went in depth into what 
caring means on an interpersonal level, and also had specific suggestions to how this could be 
incorporated into a medical curriculum. The notion of doctors learning to care in practice, 
from their patients, was an important contribution in the context of our study.  
 
A quite different approach was taken by (Mitchell, 2002), who set out to do a review of all the 
research literature from 1960 to 2000 to find out how well general practitioners deliver 
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palliative care. The word ‘deliver’ already suggests that his concept of care is different from 
that of MacLeod. He defined palliative care in line with WHO as ‘the active total care of 
patients whose disease is not responsive to curative treatment’. He saw the definition of 
general practice as being in flux, or in Still and Todd’s terms, as being in a transitional state. 
One unstable factor was whether general practice is seen as provided by an individual or by a 
team, in which the GP is only one member. Palliative care offered in teams of GPs and nurses 
got better clinical outcomes than GPs alone. When GPs involve in palliative care, their 
knowledge of patients will add value to the content knowledge of palliative experts; therefore 
outcomes for patients should improve when generalists and specialist teams work in 
collaboration, and there was some evidence for this. Some studies in the review showed poor 
correlation between the symptoms patients’ said they suffered and the doctors’ identifications 
of these symptoms. GPs could fail to identify symptoms they found difficult to manage, or 
less common symptoms. Both Australian and American family physicians felt that 
psychological symptoms were the most difficult to manage. Many physicians had low 
confidence in their own palliative care competence. Both involvement and confidence in 
palliative care augmented with years of experience. In Australia and in the UK, each GP cared 
for 5-6 terminally ill patients per year. Mitchell concluded that GPs were capable of 
‘delivering satisfactory symptom control’, but should be part of a team approach. GPs would 
profit from working formally for a while with a specialist palliative care team to learn 
enhanced from experience, alongside with palliative experts (Mitchell, 2002). In summary, 
this study’s emphasize on a team approach was important; highlighting that nurses, GPs and 
specialists each had their metiers which, working together, could contribute to a better care 
for the patients. Focusing on outcomes and performance, it revealed some blind spots on the 
GPs’ side. Knowledge of such blind spots could help GP-researchers to be more humble and 
critical towards their own profession.  
 
It seems that Mitchell did not include a study that was quite encouraging  for GPs and their 
teams (Jones et al., 1993). Out of 207 bereaved family carers of people with cancer dying at 
home in three British health districts, 150 considered the care at home given by mainly GPs 
and district nurses as excellent, 45 as good, 8 moderate, 2 poor and 2 without comments. The 
carers reported that pain was well controlled, but 25 per cent of patients had no relief from 
other symptoms like nausea and vomiting, dyspnoea, dysphagia and confusion. Many lacked 
early domestic and practical support, financial advice and information about resources outside 
the health service. The carers own problems largely went unnoticed. A later English study 
(Grande et al., 2004) found that the family carers in retrospect mainly focused on the basic 
support that had enabled them to sustain care in the home. Key issues were accessibility of the 
GP and district nurse, help from other agencies and provision of equipment and supplies. The 
attitude or approach during interactions and relationship with the professional, especially 
support from the GP, was important. It seemed quite common that GPs gave their mobile 
numbers to the family at the end-of-life, and this was greatly appreciated. These two studies 
emphasize the significance of both practical and relational help. Making the GP’s mobile 
number available includes both these aspects. 
 
In a Dutch study (Groot et al., 2005), GPs were asked in focus groups about how they 
perceived and performed their tasks in palliative care. Their descriptions are similar to those 
in Field (1998); they found palliative care responsible and difficult, but rewarding. They 
described it as complex and typical GP work, combining crucial aspects of general practice; 
medical care as well as supportive care, in close relationship to patient and family. They saw 
themselves as coordinators of the patient’s care, which was quite consuming. Their work was 
a mixture of somatic, psychosocial and coordinating tasks. From the group discussions, the 
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authors identified barriers to palliative care on a personal, relational and organizational level. 
On the personal level the themes were competence, emotions and time, on the relational level 
it was communication with the patient and relatives and with other health professionals. The 
organizational level had barriers in the form of bureaucracy, lack of continuity in homecare 
and lack of flexibility of specialized personal to perform tasks in the persons’ home.  
 
In summary, dilemmas arise from GPs’ place at a juncture between biomedicine and their 
patients’ life world. If seeing themselves as curing agents, this might result in GPs’ 
subordination to specialists. If seeing themselves as caring doctors, they might experience a 
lack of theory guiding a holistic patient care. Nevertheless, GPs have to manage the situation 
emotionally, socially and medically. Because accompanying a dying person is an extreme 
situation, GPs might become so deeply involved that they reach their human and professional 
limits. It is in these situations that they learn to care, from their dying patients. GPs have 
some blind spots when giving palliative care; working in a team with nurses and having 
access to specialist advice can improve outcomes for patients. Both practical and relational 
help is important in palliative home care, and the accessibility of the GP is crucial. Dutch GPs 
saw their work in palliative care as a mixture of somatic, psychosocial and coordinating tasks. 
This summary leads up to some open questions: How do Norwegian GPs see their place in 
cancer care, today? What might be the GP’s special contribution for a patient with cancer? 
How do GPs perceive accompanying a person through a cancer illness and towards death? 
 
International studies of how people with cancer wish to be cared for 
How do people with cancer wish to be cared for in primary care, during the whole course of 
illness? One of the first studies to explore this took place in Scotland (Kendall et al., 2006). 
People with cancer and their carers met monthly for a year in discussion groups with 
researchers. They identified five key times in the cancer journey as being especially 
significant, and made recommendations to primary care for each of them. The key times were: 
Around diagnosis, during treatment, after discharge, at recurrence and the final weeks. The 
researchers concluded that people with cancer and their families see an important and unique 
role for primary care throughout the cancer journey, valuing continuity of care and 
information that is patient-centred and holistic. This is one of the few studies asking for 
people’s views on GPs’ work during the whole illness journey. There are also some studies on 
GP’s specific role in follow-up after cancer treatment and in rehabilitation. Otherwise, most 
studies concentrate on diagnosis or end-of-life; the two points where GPs until now have been 
most involved. 
 
In the Netherlands, a research group asked both patients and their GPs what good end-of-life 
care meant to them (Borgsteede et al., 2006). The starting point for the study was that most 
people in Western countries prefer to die at home, surrounded by their relatives, implicating 
that GPs will provide end-of-life care. They found that patients and GPs had similar 
conceptions of good end-of-life care. GPs should be available, by doing regular home visits 
and also available on mobile phone out-of-hours, in case of an emergency. GPs should have 
medical competence, both in treating physical and psychological symptoms and communicate 
and cooperate well with other health professionals. Attention to the patient and continuity of 
care was also highlighted.  
 
A Belgian study (Michiels et al., 2007) asked terminally ill people with cancer about the role 
of the GP in communication and care at the end-of-life. Continuity of care emerged as an 
important aspect of GPs’ involvement. Drawing on previous theory (Haggerty et al., 2003), 
the authors highlighted relational and informational continuity. Relational continuity meant 
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having an ongoing relationship with the same GP who knew the history, not only of the 
patient but also of the family, engendering a relationship of trust and mutual understanding. 
The GP would know the patient’s preferences and be personally responsible, which 
encouraged individualized care and sensitivity in truth telling. Informational continuity meant 
that the GP was a mediator and interpreter of information from the specialists, but also one 
who prepared the patients emotionally and practically for the next phase of illness. GPs 
should consider patient values and preferences, psychological aspects, social support and 
context. GPs’ lack of time, lack of initiative and lack of knowledge were seen by some 
patients as barriers to continuity of care (Michiels et al., 2007). It seems that in this study, 
patients’ wishes fits well with GPs’ aspirations as quoted in other studies, but it also points to 
some painful lacks perceived by patients.  
 
We saw that in the Dutch study (Borgsteede et al., 2006), terminally ill patients expected their 
GPs to be accessible also out-of-hours. This did not seem to be the case (any more) in 
Scotland, where a study explored patients’ and carers’ experiences with out-of-hours care. 
(Worth et al., 2006) found that it was difficult for patients and carers to decide whether to call 
the regional out-of-hours services. They worried if they were needy and did not want to 
bother the doctor. Good information about out-of-hours care, being known to the service and 
empathic responses from the staff was helpful. The authors conclude that regular out-of-hours 
care is based predominantly on acute illness situations and biomedical criteria, and that 
special arrangements are needed to ensure integrated out-of-hours care for people at end-of-
life (Worth et al., 2006). Their conclusion is important and questions about the organization of 
out-of-hours care for these patients should be included in our study.  
 
In summary, people with cancer and their families saw an important and unique role for 
primary care throughout the cancer journey, valuing continuity of care and information that 
was patient-centred and holistic. GPs should consider patient values and preferences, social 
support and context. GPs should be available and accessible and have competence in dealing 
with bodily and mental suffering, as well as communicating and cooperating well with other 
health professionals. We will return to these wishes and challenges from patients and families 
to their GPs when discussing the results of the current study. 
 
 
Studies of diagnosing cancer in general practice 
In all human thinking, categorization is a basic process. In medicine, certain clusters of 
symptoms and signs have been assigned to clinical pictures or patterns. Recognizing such a 
pattern depends on presented cues, which in the majority of cases are, in McWhinney’s 
(1972) terms, not certain but probabilistic. Presented with probabilistic cues, the clinician 
forms hypotheses about the category to which the patient’s illness belongs. In terms of 
diagnostic challenges, general practice differs from other disciplines: Problems are diverse, 
illness is seen early, cues are fewer and less certain, decisions are made at lower levels of 
probability and a background of personal knowledge is often present (McWhinney, 1972).  
 
Diagnostic reasoning in primary care can be split into three stages: initiation of diagnostic 
hypotheses; refinement of the hypotheses; and defining the final diagnosis (Heneghan et al., 
2009). What might trigger the GP’s thought of a certain diagnosis early in a consultation? 
Building on a long research tradition on clinical reasoning (Elstein, 2009; Norman, 2005), 
four possibilities have been suggested (Heneghan et al., 2009), and most often more than one 
is active. First, an instantaneous spot diagnosis based on pattern recognition of for example 
acne or a barking cough. Second, self labelling by patients of their own diagnostic suspicion, 
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which immediately directs further refinement of the diagnosis. Self labelling can in some 
conditions, like recurrent cystitis in women, be quite accurate. Third, presenting complaint 
like head ache or stomach trouble is often used as an outset of a consultation by GPs. Forth, 
elements in the history or/and examination can, held together, function as a pattern 
recognition trigger, and initiate a hypothesis (Heneghan et al., 2009). In the refinement stage, 
strategies like restricted rule out, stepwise refinement, probabilistic reasoning, pattern 
recognition fit and clinical prediction rule are used. In the study of Heneghan et al. (2009), a 
known diagnosis was reached in 50 % of consultations, while for the rest, defining the final 
diagnosis was either attempted by ordering further tests, or undertaking a test of treatment or a 
test of time.  
 
In the research field of cancer diagnosis in primary care, Norway has two notable pioneers: 
Magne Nylenna and Knut Holtedahl. Nylenna (Nylenna, 1986a, b) found that in 429 out of 
10.000 consultations in general practice (4,3 per cent), cancer was suspected by the GP. After 
two years, 30 of these patients (7,8 per cent), were registered with cancer. Even if 11 out of 12 
suspicions were false, Nylenna found that the strength of GPs’ suspicion correlated well with 
the risk of having cancer. In as much as one in five GP-consultations, patients were worried 
about cancer (Nylenna, 1984). If patients feared that they could have cancer, the risk of 
having it was four-fold, while when the GP suspected cancer, the risk that the patient had it 
was eight-fold (Nylenna, 1986a). Holtedahl (1990, 1991) found that half of the patients who 
were diagnosed with cancer in Tromsø in 1976 had a delayed presentation to their GP. There 
was also a delay for half of the patients from the first consultation to diagnosis. About two 
thirds of the latter delay was attributed to the GP, and one third to the hospital. Altogether, 74 
% of the patients had some kind of diagnostic delay. Holtedahl found an association between 
so called warning signals and the diagnosis of cancer, but altogether warning signals did not 
discriminate well between cancer and non-cancer. He therefore suggested a more systematic 
cancer diagnostic strategy for general practice, a two step model. In the first step, the GP 
should identify whether the patient was in some risk category for cancer, leading to a higher 
prevalence. In the second step, symptom clues should be scrutinized and diagnostic pitfalls 
considered. He concluded that reducing the GPs’ delay in cancer would be possible with 
better diagnostic strategies. The usefulness of alarm symptoms for the diagnosis of cancer in 
primary care has been a main focus of research ever since.  In recent years, research has 
provided numbers that facilitate the utilisation of Holtedahl’s suggested strategy. For 
example, below the age of 50 years, rectal bleeding is almost never due to colorectal cancer, 
while in people between 70 and 80 years old, the likelihood rises to one in five (Wauters et 
al., 2000).  
 
Another pioneer in this research field, William Hamilton, asserted that in cancer diagnosis, 
there are some misconceptions; one is that GPs are not very good at diagnosing cancer. 
Attempting to clear up this misconception, he wrote: 
 
One thing most doctors have – which is almost impossible to research – is 
an innate sense that their patient is ill. The precise diagnosis may not be 
apparent, but the fact that there is one is apparent. (…) The most powerful 
predictor of cancer is not a particular symptom or test, but a GP’s 
summation of all the subtle clues present in the consultation. A clue of how 
strong this summation is comes from studies of the GPs’ records of 
patients with lung, colorectal or prostate cancer. When a variable for a 
GP’s note of possible cancer (generally written as ‘? cancer’) was added 
to a multivariable equation containing all the other significant symptoms 
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of cancer, the odds ratio for this new variable much outweighed all the 
other variables. (…) This may represent GPs identifying clinical features 
not conventionally considered relevant – like the patient’s tone of voice, or 
a subtle change in their appearance. Clinicians understand such 
subtleties, which make up the art of medicine, rather than its science 
(Hamilton, 2009:443).  
 
Summing up this section, the research by Nylenna and Holtedahl confirmed that on a GP’s 
list; only a few people will develop cancer every year. To find these cases in the jumble of 
problems that are presented to a GP is a real challenge. Research on clinical reasoning for the 
last 40 years and also the model of Heneghan et al. suggests that clinicians engender 
diagnostic hypotheses very early in the consultation and that these will frame further 
approach. Hamilton’s notion of the high predictive value of GPs’ summation of subtle clues 
and also his statement that this is nearly impossible to research, and therefore makes up the art 
of medicine, made us very interested. We were encouraged by Malterud, who argued against a 
mystification of the art of medicine, and encouraged the investigation of GPs’ tacit rationality 
(Malterud, 1995).  
 
Considering the background, the theoretical considerations and the present empirical 
knowledge, our studies are formulated. 
 
Aim of the thesis 
To explore GPs’ views of their contribution to health care for persons with cancer 
  
 Aims for each study  
1. To explore how GPs perceive and describe their place in health care for people with 
cancer, including the challenges and dilemmas that they face.  
2. To explore in depth the experiences of being a GP for people with cancer at 
different crucial points in the course of the illness, including end-of-life.  





















METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS   
 
 
Choice of method   
According to McWhinney (1989), family medicine is a human science, and should learn from 
the methodologies of other human sciences. Human science is about meaning; the meaning of 
experiences, practices, events, behaviour, utterances and so on. One way to explore what an 
experience means to a person is to enter into a dialogue, in which meaning is interpreted and 
both participants can gain new insights (McWhinney, 1989). Qualitative research is a suitable 
method for inquiry into phenomena regarding particulars like human beings. The aim of 
qualitative research is ‘to investigate the meaning of social phenomena as experienced by the 
people themselves’ (Malterud, 2001). A qualitative interview is a way of entering into a 
dialogue with the other about meaning, like McWhinney described. Or as, Kvale & 
Brinkmann (2009) put it: ‘If you want to know how people understand their world and their 
lives, why not talk with them?’  
 
As context is crucial in general practice, generalisations with explanatory and predictive 
power can often seem detached from experience. The concept ‘particulars’ was introduced by 
Gorovitz & MacIntyre (1976) as entities that ‘occupies a region of space, persists through 
time, has boundaries, and has an environment…’(1976:56). Particulars can be living 
organisms like human beings, a collective like a city, an ecosystem like a desert etc. The 
behaviour of particulars cannot be fully explained or predicted by general scientific laws. 
Their history, context and environment will be decisive. The more complex the particular, the 
greater is the uncertainty regarding the application of general principles, said Toulmin (1976), 
and added that a sick person is a very complex particular. Medicine can be seen as a science 
of particulars, attempting to apply the general laws of the basic sciences to human beings with 
a unique history. The low-level abstractions of clinical science itself, like diseases and 
syndromes, are mostly mediated through case histories, which comprises a literature of 
particulars. For doctors, experience is an ‘acquaintance with particulars’ (McWhinney, 1989) 
which might lead to clinical wisdom.  
 
For our research aim, qualitative interviews with GPs seemed the most appropriate method. 
Other possibilities would have been doing observations and/or recordings of clinical 
encounters and then interviewing afterwards. In this way the researcher would have had both 
her own observations of the GPs’ encounters and additionally the possibility of interviewing. 
Observing encounters gives the possibility of analyzing interaction in vivo, but ‘even 
observed firsthand, (events) are not inherently endowed with meaning, nor is their meaning 
unequivocally available for inspection’ (Atkinson & Coffey, 2003:427). Interviewing has the 
advantage of asking questions, discussing, confronting, attending to stories, learning more 
about background and context, intentions, explanations and ideals. Combining observations 
and interviews, they could reciprocally illuminate each other. To get the longitudinal 
perspective that we wanted for the second study, such an approach would have required an 
extensive fieldwork, thus limiting the number of GPs that could be participating. For the third 
study, we would have had to record or observe a high number of consultations to capture the 
ones in which the thought of cancer turned out to be an issue. There is a question if it is 
ethically justified to intervene in a lot of consultations when just a few of them are relevant to 
the research question. We concluded that given the limits of being a single novice researcher 
in a PhD project, just conducting interviews was a pragmatic choice which still could give 




The pragmatism of choosing an interview design was also related to my professional 
background as a PhD student. As Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) write, interview research may to 
some appear as a simple and straightforward task. As a GP, I was used to interview patients 
for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes. I thought that my background knowledge from 
general practice would be valuable in an interview situation. I imagined that I more easily 
than a researcher from other backgrounds could understand what the GPs talked about and 
maybe even ask better questions. I could use my own experiences from cancer care as a 
resonance for the GPs’ stories.  ‘An interview is literally an inter view, an inter-change of 
views between two persons conversing about a theme of mutual interest’ (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009:2). I felt that I was qualified by profession and experience for this inter-
change, and I thought that the participating colleagues would regard me as a qualified 
conversation partner. However, I also suspected that in some issues, I could be blinded by 
having undergone the same professional socialization as the participants and having shared 
most of their working conditions. Collegial sympathies and mutual professional interests 
could easily lead to a lack of critical distance and an idealization of the GPs work. Their 
perspective of looking at health care would probably to a great extent coincide with mine only 
that for now, I had put on the spectacles of a researcher. Going to visit the GPs, I would have 
to combine the knowledge and credibility of an insider with the openness and curiosity of an 
outsider. The challenge of creating a distance was even greater in that my supervisors were 
also GPs.  
 
More over, the larger research group also contained mostly academic GPs. Our parent 
department of community medicine was constituted mainly by epidemiologists and 
statisticians, to whom qualitative research was a rarity. From the start, it seemed important to 
get input into this project from other sources as well. Taking part in PhD courses given by 
other departments, other faculties and other universities was valuable, but most important was 
the continuous participation in two different study groups with researchers from several fields, 
like pedagogy, anthropology, arts and nursing science. In these groups of mainly PhD-
students, we discussed qualitative research literature on method and theory, but most 
importantly we read and commented on each others proposals, drafts and manuscripts. 
Likewise I took part in a longitudinal, session-based PhD-course at the department for health 
sciences, where senior researchers, a sociologist and a philosopher, amongst others, 
commented on our proposals and drafts. As a guest researcher for a semester at The Research 
Unit for General Practice in Copenhagen, I also took part in a rich interdisciplinary 
discussion. To counteract the danger of professional inbreeding, I have very actively searched 
for a dialogue on matters like epistemology and methodology and also subjected this project 
to interdisciplinary criticism on several occasions. Such discussions could affirm that we were 














An important epistemological question that has been considered throughout the project is: 
What kind of knowledge can we get from interviews? From an empirical perspective, 
knowledge comes from observation of facts. Interviewing can from this point of view be seen 
as a collection of data, as illustrated by Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) in a metaphor of mining: 
 
The knowledge is waiting in the subject’s interior to be uncovered, uncontaminated by 
the miner. The interviewer digs nuggets of knowledge out of a subject’s pure 
experiences, unpolluted by any leading questions. The nuggets may be understood as 
objective real data or as subjective authentic meanings (2009:48). 
 
An alternative understanding would be the researcher as a traveller in a foreign country, 
telling a tale upon coming home.  
 
The interviewer-traveller, in line with the original Latin meaning of conversation as 
“wandering together with”, walks along with the local inhabitants, asking questions 
and encouraging them to tell their own stories (…). The potentialities of meanings in 
the original stories are differentiated and unfolded through the traveller’s 
interpretations of the narratives he or she brings back to home audiences. The journey 
may not only lead to new knowledge; the traveller might change as well (2009:49). 
 
 
As the mining metaphor concerns not only empiricist data collection, but also to some extent 
Socrates’ pursuit of the truth or Husserl’s search for phenomenological essences (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009), these complementary epistemologies were continuously debated in our 
research group, and will also be discussed throughout these chapters. Reading the thesis, I 
think you would find traces of both ways of looking at interviewing, revealing both a 
minefield of epistemological stumbling stones and a traveller in transition.  
 
On the way to a PhD, the researcher not only wanders with her participants, supervisors and 
other researchers, but also with philosophers and theoreticians. Perceiving only bits and 
pieces of their assertions at the outset, towards the end of the journey I will now refer briefly 
to their respective influence in this project. The synthesis below draws on Kvale & 
Brinkmann (2009), Alvesson & Sköldberg (2009) and my own literature studies. 
 
Phenomenology was originally a continental philosophy of consciousness, experience and the 
human life-world, founded by Husserl, elaborated in an existential direction by Heidegger and 
towards a philosophy of bodily perception by Merleau-Ponty. With Schütz , phenomenology 
travelled on from Europe to America and from philosophy into the social sciences, 
influencing amongst others Berger & Luckmann  and Garfinkel. With phenomenology, the 
life world of human beings was rehabilitated in relation to the world of science. The approach 
of phenomenology coined our interest in understanding a social phenomenon (cancer care) 
from the actors’ (GPs’) own perspectives and ‘to describe the world as experienced by the 
subjects, with the assumption that the important reality is what people perceive it to be’ 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009:26).  
 
Another influence in this project was the American philosophy of pragmatism, originally 
developed by Pierce, James and Dewey, emphasizing the primacy of practice and the utility of 
scientific knowledge. Presuming that language and knowledge are not copies of reality but 
means of coping with a changing world, conversation is seen as a basic mode of knowing. 
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Pragmatism inspired the theoretical perspective of symbolic interactionism developed by 
Blumer and Mead. They assumed that society, reality and self are constructed through 
interaction; language and communication. Seeing this interaction is inherently dynamic and 
interpretive, symbolic interactionism addresses how humans create, enact and change 
meanings and actions. The qualitative research approach of Grounded Theory, developed by 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) were inspired by symbolic interactionism. The thorough and rigid 
methodological advices of Grounded Theory, developed further in a more constructivist 
direction amongst others by Charmaz (2006), have been inspiring also for this project. 
Pragmatism fits well with being a practitioner, and a main theoretician of practice, Schön 
(1991), which I refer to, can be seen as writing in a pragmatist tradition.  
 
Hermeneutics was originally the study of interpretation of texts. Central to hermeneutics is the 
interpretation of meaning. A basic assumption is that the meaning of a part can only be 
understood in relation to the whole. Conversely, the whole can only be understood from the 
parts. These relations constitute the concept of the hermeneutical circle. The contradiction of 
terms inherent in the concept indicates that logic cannot fully explain the workings of 
understanding. To grasp the meaning of the parts and the whole, an intuitive and creative 
‘leap’ is necessary (Palmer, 1969). Meaning was in classical hermeneutics seen as a search for 
the author’s intention, which the skilled interpreter should unveil.  
 
According to philosophical hermeneutics, understanding is not only the peak of scientific 
effort, but the basic existential condition for every human being, a necessity to survive on an 
everyday basis. Language is not mainly representative, but constitutes human reality. Human 
beings are always already interpreting an ever-changing life world, and our practices are laden 
with theory and temporality. Thus a second hermeneutical circle appears; an iterative dialogue 
between our pre-understanding and an emergent new understanding. Without pre-
understanding there is no understanding. However, pre-understanding can preclude 
understanding (Gadamer, 1960). The notion of text has been extended to all human 
meaningful action (Ricoeur, 1984). Moreover, every text derives its meaning from a con-text. 
History, tradition, place and perspective provide contextual interpretive horizons. 
 
The epistemologies outlined above share some assumptions. Life world experience is always 
prior to scientific knowledge. Knowledge does not reside inside a person or outside in the 
world, but in relationships between people and the world. Knowledge is not a mirror of 
reality, but is interpreted and negotiated in a social web, and validated through practice.  
 
On the background of the insights above, some features of the knowledge gained from 
qualitative interviews can be outlined. Interview knowledge is produced, relational, 
conversational, contextual, linguistic, narrative and pragmatic, as is the social and historical 
world of human interaction (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Learning is better explained by a 
qualitative change in a person’s way of viewing, understanding and conceptualizing 
something in the world, than as an increase in the amount of knowledge (Barnard et al., 
1999). 
 
Interview knowledge is constructed first through the social interaction of interviewer and 
interviewee, through questions and answers, then restructured through transcription, analysis 
and reporting. Inter-viewing creates inter-relational knowledge, through conversational 
negotiations about meaning. The meanings of interview statements relate to the interpersonal 
interview context and to the local life context of the interviewee. Interview knowledge is 
mediated through language, and the participants’ use of linguistic means is often also 
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analyzed. Interview knowledge is often narrative, as stories make sense of incidents and 
participation in social life. The pragmatic aspect of interview knowledge concerns the ever 
human search to perform effective actions and master a practical situation; good research 
enables us to understand and thereby cope with the world (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).  
 
Each of the mentioned features of interview knowledge points to its possibilities, but also to 
its limitations. Interview statements cannot automatically be taken at face value, but should be 
critically considered in its context of inter-relations. Interview knowledge is not context-
independent and cannot automatically be transferred to other situations. Interviews are not 
primarily reports from which a social reality can be retrospectively reconstructed. Stories 
should be treated as ways of making sense of events, not as accurate reports of what has 
happened. The reliance on verbal language complicates the access to tacit, emotional and 
bodily interaction and knowledge. Sitting down to talk can seem detached from meaningful 
action and practice.  
 
Planning our study, we tried to consider these features of interview knowledge. As 
McWhinney remarked, GPs have difficulty speaking about general practice without speaking 
about their patients. To explore how general practitioners perceive and describe their place in 
health care for people with cancer, asking for stories about their care for individual patients 
throughout the course of illness seemed highly relevant. Case stories are generally the way 
doctors pass on and discuss medical information (Hunter, 1991), hence the format would be 
well known to both interviewer and interviewee. The unusual now would be for both to focus 
on the doctors’ side of the story, and on the interaction between doctor and patient. Asking for 
stories was a pragmatic way of keeping the GPs close to the original experience of having 



























Sampling and interviewing  
The sampling for our study was already done before I was engaged as a researcher. The 
process has been explained to me as follows: The participants were recruited through survey 
questionnaires about cancer and primary care, which were sent to municipalities throughout 
Norway. The questionnaires dealt with GPs’ participation in care for individual patients with 
cancer throughout the course of illness and also had a question about the GPs’ willingness to 
take part in an interview. The results of that survey are not yet published. The response rate 
was low, while the percentage of the participants who opted for an interview was 67 per cent 
(Professor Knut Arne Holtedahl, personal communication). GPs who had indicated in the 
survey that they had been involved in many tasks during several phases of a patient’s illness, 
including palliative care, were preferably chosen, assuming that they would have rich sources 
of experience to draw on in a conversation. Moreover, the sampling aimed for a variation in 
gender, place of practice and years of experience as a GP. Hence, the sample was purposive, 
counting 16 GPs. The participants had already received a letter from the university, and had 
already supplied written consents to an interview. I received the consents, together with 
copies of the GPs’ completed survey questionnaires. Each questionnaire addressed the illness 
course of one particular patient, and how the GP was involved. Most GPs had filled out one 
form, but several had filled out forms for two patients. 
 
 
First study – papers 1 and 2 
During the fall of 2007, I contacted the GPs, first by e-mail and then by mobile phone, to 
make appointments, and started on several interesting journeys around Norway to undertake 
the interviews. It turned out that one of the GPs had quit and moved to another region, and 
another was located at a place difficult to combine with other interviews. For practical and 
economical reasons, these two GPs were not visited. Thus, encounters with 14 GPs comprised 
the basis for the two first studies in this thesis. A table containing our reflections before the 
interviews and the interview guide for this first interview round is found in Article 1, as is a 
table containing information about the participants. Most interviews were conducted in the 
GPs’ office. One interview took place in the researcher’s office, and another interview in the 
GP’s home.  
 
In this first interview round, regarding the GPs work during the whole course of cancer 
illness, I brought copies of the completed patient questionnaires from each GP, and asked if 
they wanted to tell me about these patients, or if they had other, more recent patients with 
cancer that came more readily and vividly to their mind. In most interviews, the participants 
chose to talk about the same patients as in the questionnaires. In four interviews, we talked 
about two different patients, in the other ten interviews we talked about one patient. Thus, the 
GPs told about altogether 18 patients. As stated in paper 1, ten patients had died by the time 
of the interview with their GP: four died at home, four in hospital and two in a nursing home. 
Six were receiving palliative treatment and only two were survivors. They were suffering 
from a variety of cancers, located in the breast, lung, gastro intestine, prostate, ovary, kidney, 
liver and brain.  
 
The starting question was broad and open: Tell me about this patient’s story and how you 
were involved. Such open-ended questions let the interviewees choose the dimensions of the 
questions they want to answer, which is interesting in itself (Marton, 1988). Secondary 
questions were placed when they fitted into the developing dialogue. For a list of themes that I 




Second study – paper 3 
For the third study, the same GPs were contacted again during the spring of 2010. Since 2007, 
one GP was retired and one had moved to an administrative job, so 12 GPs received 
information about the new study by ordinary mail. One GP did not return the enclosed sheet 
with informed consent, resulting in a second encounter with 11 GPs. Two of the interviews 
were this time conducted as a videoconference, due to long distances and a limited budget. A 
third interview took place outdoors and a fourth in the GP’s home. All interviews lasted for 
about one hour and were recorded digitally. 
 
I sent an e-mail to the GPs as a preparation, inviting them to think about consultations during 
which the thought of cancer arose, see Fig. 1 in paper 3. It turned out that few of the GPs had 
taken time to read this beforehand, so many interviews started with me reading the short letter 
aloud to them. Most of the interview consisted of the GPs telling me stories about patients in 
whom they had thought of cancer, and some in whom they had not thought of it, who turned 
out to have it. I tried to get some basic information about the patients and the diagnostic 
process in each story, and had a list of secondary questions to fit in, see Fig 1 in paper 3. As 
there were around 70 patient stories during the 11 interviews, the space for each was limited.  
 
I had some questions in the guide which turned out to be sensitive. One was about intuition, a 
subject not often discussed in medical education. Still, the question was discussed in all but 
one interview, either on the initiative of the participant or the interviewer. Two other 
questions were about GPs’ bodily reactions during consultations, and how they managed to 
enter into the patients’ stories. These topics were, due to their sensitive character as perceived 
by the interviewer, touched upon only in a couple of interviews.  
 
 
Unplanned interview settings 
In the second round of interviews, I could build upon the acquaintance from the first round. 
This led me to opt for two interviews per telecommunication, due to long distances. In one 
case, the interview was done via Skype while the GP had lunch in her office. The other 
interview was done with the GP sitting in the local telecom studio. Both worked quite well, 
but I think that both interviews would have profited qualitatively from a face to face setting. 
There were two other unplanned interview settings. One participant had quitted his job as a 
GP in a rural village shortly before the interview. He therefore received me in his new home 
in a larger city, and the interview became an interesting reflection, thinking back on the five 
years he had worked in the small community. Another participant was doing a hospital 
rotation, and was on night call the night before the interview. As this was a fine summer 
morning, we agreed to meet outdoors, bringing coffee and biscuits to a green hill outside a 
churchyard. On the recording, I could hear the birds singing, and also, at the end of the 
interview, this young doctor’s tale about the illness and death of her own father under 
unworthy circumstances. I doubt that this personal story would have been told if we had met 
in a surgery or a hospital. I asked myself in afterthought if the timing and setting had been in-
appropriate for the interview; placing a doctor bare feet in beautiful surroundings when being 
thin-skinned after a sleepless night. The improvised interview settings were, however, also 
results of the tight schedules of most GPs. For many of them, finding an hour’s time for an 
interview was difficult, and it was an advantage if interviewing could be combined with some 





As part of a larger project about cancer and primary care, initiated by professor Knut A. 
Holtedahl, this study received a formal ethical approval from the Regional Committee for 
Medical and Health Research Ethics of Northern Norway in 2005 (Ref 200503439-
10/IAY/400) and later also from the Data Inspectorate of Norway (Ref 05/01607-9/CGN). In 
the mean time, Norwegian health research legislation has been changed, and from 2009, a 
study that neither does direct research on patients, biological material nor personal health 
information might not require such approvals at all.  
 
Informed consent from the GPs had been obtained in several rounds. As explained in the 
previous section, the participants were sampled from people who already had consented 
informally to an interview. Through a personal postal letter, enclosing a consent form, they 
were briefly informed again, and had another possibility of saying no or not to answer. 
However, all invited GPs returned a written consent for the first interview, and all but one of 
those who were eligible for a second interview did so. It should be remarked that the survey 
was not anonymous. Norway is a small country, and many GPs knew the initiator of the 
study. Answering the survey with their full names, it might have been difficult for some GPs 
to say no to an interview, presuming that non-participation could be seen negatively by the 
research group or by the university. Also, withdrawing when contacted personally by a 
colleague is not easy; completing might feel like a moral obligation.  
 
Confidentiality in our study had to be considered for both the patients whom the GPs told 
about, and for the GPs themselves. The interviewer did not know the identity of the patients, 
only their age, gender and type of cancer. However, the full illness story as told by the GP, 
eventually combined with some contextual information, would make the case recognizable to 
people who knew the patient. Remembering that neither the patients themselves nor their 
families have been asked for consent about being part of the research on their GP’s practice, 
special care had to be taken. A table containing patient characteristics was omitted, partly for 
reasons of confidentiality. In paper 2, dealing with longitudinal stories of the doctor-patient 
relationship, concerns of patient confidentiality had to be especially focused upon. I chose to 
make some slight changes in information about the patients or their context to make the 
stories less recognizable.  
 
The interviewed GPs have, unlike the patients in their stories, consented to be interviewed and 
deliberately shared their experiences and opinions. However, as a premise for being 
interviewed, they have been promised confidentiality. Interview recordings have been stored 
safely, and transcripts have been anonymized. Citations and presentations of one particular 
GP had to be considered for questions of recognisability. Certainly, most GPs will recognize 
their own statements, and theoretically, some of their close colleagues or the patients 
themselves might recognize a story, and then indirectly figure out who the interviewed GP 
might be. However, these people all know much more than the interviewer about the patient, 
the family and the GP, and have their own well-founded version of the stories and their own 
perceptions of the people involved. Still, the researchers’ interpretation and presentation of 
the storied events might be unfamiliar, uncomfortable or even offending to the interviewees 







Further ethical considerations 
As the human interaction in the interview affects the interviewee (and the interviewer) and the 
knowledge produced affects our understanding of the human conditions under study, an 
interview inquiry is a moral enterprise, loaded with ethical issues which by far exceed 
principles and formalities. Many ethical issues of interviewing cannot be solved by a 
procedural approach, but requires practical wisdom and situated judgment. 
 
Relevance 
Health service research should serve both scientific interests and human welfare. The social 
contribution of a study should include increased knowledge of the human condition, human 
behaviour and people’s understanding of themselves and others (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).  
Regarding the aims of this study, they seemed to have the potential to fulfil the claims of a 
social contribution. GPs are in the frontline of health care, and how they perceive their work 
in a broad field like cancer has consequences for many people, especially in countries like 
ours with a gatekeeper system. Norway still needs to develop care for people dying at home, 
and it is important to know more about GPs’ possible contribution to this. Knowledge about 
how GPs become aware of cancer in a consultation is important because cancer is mainly 
diagnosed in primary care.  Moreover, the study could contribute to more consciousness 




The relationship between interviewer and interviewee is central in qualitative interviewing. 
Interviewing peers means that both share a similar role or status, a similar body of knowledge 
and an ongoing professional relationship (Coar & Sim, 2006). ‘(R)esearcher and researched 
are bound together by a powerful set of common experiences and attributions of professional 
identity’(Chew-Graham et al., 2002:287). This equality could result in feelings of professional 
credibility, confidence, cooperation and solidarity, which could encourage an open and rich 
conversation, permit vulnerability and open up the possibility of talking about sensitive 
issues. However, striving for an atmosphere of intimacy and openness may also have side-
effects, leading interviewees to disclose stories they may later regret having shared (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009).A shared understanding of the research field by interviewer and 
interviewee might be problematic in a qualitative inquiry, ‘precisely because such methods 
are intended to interrogate the tacit, taken for granted understandings that underpin everyday 
life’ (Chew-Graham et al., 2002) p. 287. Qualitative inquiry can, however, also aim at a 
manifest level of content; see later in this chapter about content analysis.  
 
Possible harm 
In this study, several sensitive issues were already explicitly stated: Challenges and dilemmas 
in caring for people with cancer, exploring in depth experiences of being a GP for people with 
cancer at different crucial points in the course of the illness, including dying, and talking 
about diagnosing cancer, which easily could lead the thoughts to overseeing cancer. ‘In an 
interview with a fellow professional the individual’s professional identity is at stake, and steps 
are therefore taken to protect this identity’ (Coar & Sim, 2006:254). To be interviewed by a 
colleague about one’s practice could feel like being under professional scrutiny, like a test of 
knowledge or an examination (Coar & Sim, 2006), especially if the GP-researcher was a 
clinical expert in the field under study (Chew-Graham et al., 2002). However, also researchers 
with other backgrounds could be experienced as an external threat. It is important to 
acknowledge that ‘there is an element of assessment or adjudication of quality in studies that 
seek to explore (…) clinical practice’ (Chew-Graham et al., 2002:289). Protecting oneself 
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from such external adjudication through hesitance to talk about certain topics is 
understandable, especially if the research is perceived to result in even greater professional 
demands (2002). This is certainly a concern that our study has to address: What might be the 
consequences of the study, both for the participants, for the group they represent and for 
society in general? Could our conclusions and implications contribute to an increased pressure 
on GPs in the field of cancer care? Or, may our interpretations contribute to romanticize 
general practice, covering up critical aspects that another perspective would have revealed?  
 
Closeness and distance 
A practical measure was to stage the interviews in the GPs’ surgeries, where they would feel 
professionally at home, and also have access to the patient files, if needed. One GP was 
interviewed in the researcher’s office at the university. This GP had, however, an affiliation 
with the university. Some GPs said they felt privileged to be visited by the researcher, and 
wondered that I had travelled for many hours to reach their surgeries. Some took the 
opportunity to show me around on their premises and explained about local circumstances. 
One GP in a rural area invited me to have dinner and stay overnight with her family, before 
interviewing her at the surgery the next day. Another GP invited me for supper and 
interviewing in her home, because this fitted better with her schedule. I accepted both 
invitations, regarding them as expressions of hospitality and opportunities to get acquainted 
before the more formal interview setting. Interviewing people in their homes is common when 
the research subject is more of a personal matter, and I guess that researchers often are invited 
to have a coffee or sometimes even share a meal with their interviewees. Staying overnight is 
probably uncommon in an interview context; however, in an ethnographic study the 
researcher might share the dwellings of a community and live in participants’ homes for a 
longer period of time. The balance of closeness and distance between researcher and 
participants in qualitative inquiry has, like in any human relation, to be continually negotiated. 
A small country like Norway with a small scene of GPs means that the researcher will 
inevitably know at least the names and faces of some of the interviewees beforehand, and 
meeting again in professional or even private circumstances is quite likely. Thus, taking well 
care of the shared information becomes a personal and professional responsibility towards the 
interviewees. This might heighten the ethical sensitivity of the researcher but also impair 
critical interpretations.  
 
 
Interviewing as debriefing  
During the 25 interviews, I several times went through a patient history together with the 
interviewee in a way that turned into a kind of debriefing. Mostly the GPs seemed to be 
content with their own appearance in the stories. I felt that in some of the cases, the review of 
the whole course of illness with all its complications and difficult decisions was done for the 
first time. Sometimes GPs asked themselves if they had done the right things on the way, and 
feelings of guilt or regret were occasionally ventilated. In one case, the debriefing of one 
particularly unfortunate history (of lacking interaction between levels of health care) lasted 
through the larger part of the interview, leaving little time to touch upon the other themes 
from the interview guide. Particularly in this conversation, I was also asked questions about 
the legitimacy of moral choices. In these kinds of conversations, I clearly felt the advantage of 
being a colleague, a professional person found worthy of receiving the stories, and also with 
the potential of understanding and valuing them. The GPs’ emotional involvements in relation 
to the patients were rarely explicitly mentioned, but could be heard from the tone of voice, 
repetitions, urgency of speak, silences or choice of words. Interestingly, questions about the 
GPs’ own emotions were not discussed when planning the study and were not included in the 
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interview guide. I wonder if the omission of explicit emotional themes was due to blind spot 
amongst doctors, including academic GPs. As implicit themes, emotions take part in any 
human conversation, also in these interviews, and can be listened for and looked for, which 
we also did, in retrospect.  
 
Confrontation and resistance 
Research can be seen as a learning experience. The researcher is finding something out, and 
the research subjects are also learning. During the interview, the ‘interviewer works together 
with the interviewee to bring forth his awareness of undertaking the task’, and the interviewee 
is ‘reflecting over his experience in a state of “meta-awareness”, being aware of his awareness 
of something’ (Marton & Booth, 1997:130). In our case, one ‘task’ was to think back on 
previous consultations, trying to remember when and how the thought of cancer arose. Marton 
& Booth differentiate between two levels of the interview: First, the interpersonal contact that 
resembles a social discourse, and second, more of a therapeutic discourse, in which ‘the 
interviewer is trying to free the interviewee of hitherto unsuspected reflections’ (1997). To 
achieve this, one can try alternative questions, bringing the interviewee repeatedly back to the 
focus of reflection, or offer interpretations of earlier statements. Like in a therapeutic 
situation, resistance might occur; the interviewee can set up a defence and deny further 
discussion. Bypassing these defences and making the interviewee aware of his own thoughts 
should only be done with great caution, as it can be painful, but according to Marton & Booth, 
it might be necessary. Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) include in their book examples of 
interviewers going this far, like Robert Bellah (p. 37) and Pierre Bourdieu (p.6).  
 
Being a novice researcher interviewing colleagues, I did not intend to be confrontational or 
bypass their defences. If I experienced resistance, I backed out. A question about the use of 
guidelines, which was originally in the guide for the first interview round, caused suspicion in 
an interviewee. He asked if I was coming around to check if they were following guidelines. 
As this was an early interview and the question was not essential for our research aims, I 
decided to skip the question from the guide. I also met resistance in one colleague when I 
asked about his view of intuition. He did not want to use the word at all, so I left it. A more 
offensive approach would have been to come back to it later, for example asking: I noticed 
that you did not want to use the word intuition, do you mind telling me about your thoughts 
on this word? This could have been a way of keeping a certain distance to the interviewee, but 
still I would try to get closer to what I reckoned as an interesting aspect of his experiences.  
 
Marton & Booth (1997) claim that  
 
the question of balance in terms of overcoming defences and the issue of distance 
versus closeness is ever present in the more reflective parts of an interview, in which 
the interviewer could easily destroy the relationship by pressing too hard or not hard 
enough, or by getting too close or not close enough. 
 
How could the relationship be harmed by not pressing hard enough or not coming close 
enough? A good dialogue can be seen as having a forward movement towards a turning point. 
This might be perceived as a promise; the participant expects to get the decisive question, and 
might feel abandoned if it is not asked. Courage is, like knowledge, interactive. When going 
out on thin ice, one needs the other as companion and rescuer. What also might be harmed is 
the sincerity and truthfulness of a shared search for understanding, and also the depth and 





Analysing interview data starts during the interview. The interviewer both tacitly and 
reflectively interprets statements from the interviewee, on the background the whole interview 
interaction and of her own preconceptions. I did this reflective process for example by asking 
the interviewee clarifying questions or thinking aloud about my interpretations of statements. 
The analysis goes on as the interviewer thinks back on the conversation, writing down her 
first impressions in a field note, and further when she several times listens to the recordings. 
The transcription from oral to written language is also a structuring and analytic process. 
Unclear wordings are interpreted or given up; para-linguistic expressions are noted or left out; 
dialect is normalized into standard written language and grammatical devices like commas 
and full stops are distributed, just to mention some of the many choices taken. The expression 
‘transcribed ad verbatim’ which is a standard in qualitative papers does in my opinion conceal 
the interpretative and analytic process involved when qualitatively transforming and reducing 
oral exchange into the written genre. After the first interview round, I performed the 
transcriptions myself. Due to time pressure, the second interview round was transcribed by an 
experienced assistant. After transcription, the interview files were entered into the computer 
software NVivo8, later NVivo9, to facilitate further analysis. For each of the three studies, we 
decided on a different approach for the further analysis of the transcripts.  
 
Content analysis 
The aim of the first study was going to get an overview on GPs’ work in health care for 
patients with cancer, as seen by the GPs themselves. The analytic approach should be suited 
for sifting through the whole dataset and favour a descriptive overview more than going into 
the dept of the GPs’ lived experience or build a coherent grounded theory. We opted for an 
inductive, qualitative content analysis, a design which is appropriate when there is limited 
theory or research literature on a phenomenon, and the aim is to attain a condensed and broad 
description (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The first steps in this procedure 
are similar to several other qualitative approaches focusing on meaning, like grounded theory, 
empirical phenomenology or phenomenography. As a novice, I found the step-for-step 
introductory books by Malterud (2003) and Charmaz (2006) useful for learning a broad 
interpretative approach. The steps they recommended were as follows: The transcripts are all 
read several times, to achieve immersion and obtain a sense of the whole (Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005). The reader should note her impressions of preliminary themes relating to the research 
questions (Malterud, 2003). The texts are then approached systematically; line by line or 
incident by incident, looking for meaning units consisting of words, sentences or paragraphs 
that relate to each other both in content and context (Charmaz, 2006; Graneheim & Lundman, 
2004), and looking for words that could capture the key thought or concept of the meaning 
unit (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This can be done in several steps, first meaning condensation 
and then abstracting this further into a code, naming the key thought or meaning. Often this 
whole process of finding meaning units, condensing and abstracting them is referred to as 
open coding. The next step is focused coding, using the most significant or frequent earlier 
codes to sift through larger amounts of data (Charmaz, 2006). Codes are then sorted into 
meaningful clusters called categories, according to perceived relations and linkages between 
the codes, found by moving iteratively between a single interview and the whole sample of 
interviews ((Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Marton, 1988; Marton & Booth, 1997). Ideally, 
categories should be exhaustive and mutually exclusive. However, human experiences are 
intertwined and not always dividable into mutually exclusive categories. The process of 
coding and categorizing is intensive, time-consuming, detailed, demanding and creative brain 
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work, which is aided both by discussion within the research group and writing memos of 
impressions, ideas and emergent concepts (Charmaz, 2006).  
 
An example of the process of coding and categorization in our first study is found in Article 1, 
Table IV. We started off coding for a lot of different GP-tasks, roles, actions and qualities. It 
was not until very late in the process that suddenly, in a joint creative movement, an idea of a 
pattern emerged from the piles of condensed meanings and codes. The pattern consisted of 
what we have called the three aspects of GPs’ work in cancer care; the practical, the 
mediating and the personal. To sharpen the understanding of what these aspects were about, 
we called the GP in these three roles respectively an efficient handyman, a flexible 
intermediary and a touched companion, see Article 1, Table III. Thus, the results were 
comprised in a simple conceptual model. According to Hsieh & Shannon (2005), this is as far 
as one can get with inductive content analysis. The sampling and analytic procedure is not 
suitable for developing further theoretical relationships between concepts, which was also not 





For the second study, we wanted to explore in depth the experiences of being a GP for people 
with cancer at different crucial points in the course of the illness, including end-of-life, using 
the same dataset as in the first study. Thus, the focus was on the third aspect of the GPs’ work 
in study one; the personal aspect; being a companion. In study one; we had already seen that 
some of the greatest challenges and dilemmas that the GPs told about related to the personal 
aspect, and particularly the patients’ fear of death. How could we take the analysis further to 
develop a deeper understanding of the GPs’ challenges and dilemmas? Obviously, the 
narrative character of the interviews had not been taken fully into consideration in the first 
study. In content analysis, the text is broken down to small pieces of ‘meaning units’ which 
then are joined with other such small text pieces into clusters with similar meanings. 
However, the interviews mainly consisted of stories, 18 long ones about the patients already 
mentioned, but also 18 shorter ones, anecdotes about other patients with cancer that the GPs 
came to think of as we talked.  
 
Stories or narratives (I will use these terms interchangeably) contain the temporal aspect of a 
phenomenon, for example of the course of illness and the doctor-patient relationship. Through 
their plot, stories create a relation between events, ‘imposing a meaningful pattern on what 
would otherwise be random and disconnected’(Riessman, 2008:5). Stories also contain an 
explicit or implicit evaluation on behalf of the narrator, which points to the moral meaning of 
the story (Labov & Waletzky, 1997). Through stories, individuals and collectives make sense 
of events, create order out of chaos, connect with others and construct identities, but also 
entertain, argue, persuade, engage, mobilize or mislead their audiences (Riessman, 2008). 
According to Bruner (1987), individuals might come to be the narratives the tell about their 
lives, and this can be taken advantage of for therapeutic purposes (Mattingly, 1998). Personal 
stories draw on the web of myths and meta-narratives that underlie a particular culture, and 
also on well-known genres of stories, like the hero’s journey (Frank, 1995; Riessman, 2008). 
Narratives are often compelled by a breach in the commonplace.  
 
From the short introduction to narrative theories above, we could assume that the GPs’ stories 
in our material would take us to events that were challenging or represented dilemmas for 
them. We understood that the narratives would aid their construction of a professional identity 
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and that they would draw on meta-narratives about what it means to be a good GP. We 
learned that looking for an implicit or explicit evaluation by the storyteller would lead to a 
hint about the moral values at stake in the story. A summary of our concrete analytic 
procedure regarding the interviews is found in the Methods-section of Paper 2.  
 
Studying the interviews with narrative lenses opened up for new analytic insights. It was 
impressive to realize what actually had been blended out by the content analysis. For an 
example, look at the citation of dr. S on p. 6 in paper 2, and her use of evaluative statements: 
Strange, bizarre, very unpleasant, one of worst things I have ever experienced…This story 
refers to a deep breach in the commonplace, and decisive values for this doctor seem to be at 
stake, maybe threatening her identity as a GP. The most obvious conflict referred to here is 
between the judgments of a local practitioner and a distant specialist, which again involves 
important aspects of the history of medicine, see for example Jewson (1976). To understand 
the depth of this and other stories, it was important for us to review the moral and historical 
foundations of medicine and also the development of the doctor-patient relationship, as seen 
in the introduction of this thesis and also in the introduction of paper 2. Thus, every text 
derives its meaning from a con-text, and history, tradition, place and perspective provide 
contextual interpretative horizons.  
 
Phenomenography 
The third study was methodically the most challenging, as it set out to explore a tacit 
phenomenon: How the thought of cancer arises during a consultation. The aim of the study 
was loaded with epistemological challenges, and the choice of analytic approach was decided 
on this background. We needed an approach that in its foundations clearly reflected on 
epistemological issues. Phenomenography has a relational view of knowledge, seeing the 
researcher as a learner who seeks the meaning and structure of her phenomenon by asking 
people about their experiences of it (Barnard et al., 1999).  Phenomenography implies that we 
cannot gain knowledge about phenomenons like learning, thinking or discovering as such, 
these psychological entities are epistemologically unattainable. However, we can aim at 
describing, analyzing and understanding people’s experiences of phenomenons like learning, 
thinking or discovering (Marton, 1981). Phenomenography has a way of experiencing 
something, a conception, as the unit of enquiry, and the variation in ways of experiencing 
phenomena as the object of research (Marton & Booth, 1997:111). Phenomenography is 
related to empirical phenomenology. The ontological assumption of both traditions is that the 
only world that we can communicate about is the world that we experience. While 
phenomenology studies how world and subject mutually constitute each other on a perceptual, 
preconceptual level, phenomenography mostly studies conceptualized phenomena in a 
socially constructed world. While phenomenology searches for an essence in people’s 
experience of a phenomenon, the epistemological assumption of phenomenography is that 
humans experience the world differently, but that these differences can be described, 
communicated and understood by others (Sjöström & Dahlgren, 2002).  
 
A way of experiencing, a conception, represents the interrelationship between the person 
experiencing and an experienced phenomenon. Experiences are seen as neither mental nor 
physical entities, neither as located in the individual nor in the world, neither in the mind nor 
in matter, but as a relationship between the individual and the world –experiences are 
essentially non-dualistic (Marton & Booth, 1997) p. 122. Thus the world, and our experience 
of it, is both subjective and objective at the same time, and between them there is a tension 
that gives both positions a meaning (Barnard et al., 1999). The objective of a 
phenomenographic study is to reveal the variation of ways of experiencing a phenomenon, 
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regardless of whether the differences are between individuals or within individuals. The way 
in which a person experiences a phenomenon consitutes one facet of the phenomenon. When 
the researcher describes the different ways of experiencing a phenomenon, she is partially 
describing the phenomenon, through categories of description. Assuming that the 
qualitatively different ways of experiencing a particular phenomenon relate to each other, the 
categories of description are ordered in an outcome space.  
 
The step-wise process of text analysis is very similar to that of content analysis, which was 
described earlier. However, the purpose of a phenomenographic analysis is to look for 
variation. A helpful question might be: Which perspective makes a certain statement about the 
phenomenon become logical? For example, in our material, the general fear of overseeing 
cancer was something qualitatively different from a gut feeling of unrest regarding a specific 
illness presentation. According to Marton & Booth (1997), the number of ways that we are 
capable of experiencing any phenomenon is limited; otherwise we would not be able to 
communicate about the world. Ways of experiencing, or conceptions, draw on our history, 
culture, education, ideals and values. Even if conceptions are fundamental to the way that we 
enquire, judge, practise and live, they are seldom indentified. Different conceptions can be 
found both between and within individuals. ‘To be aware of conceptions is to be aware of our 
social reality and ourselves’ (Barnard et al., 1999:219). Conceptions arise from the interaction 
between our presumptions, social imperatives, expectations and experience. Just as there are 
differences in conceptions, there are also similarities; convictions that are reiterated and used 
as criterions for judgement. They represent individual and group hierarchies of values, beliefs 
and ways of thinking, which might be called a collective mind, or a collective anatomy of 
awareness. ‘To reveal this collective anatomy of awareness is the path of phenomenography’ 
(Marton & Booth, 1997). According to this, we may say that we have studied partial aspects 
of the collective mind of Norwegian GPs, regarding their experiences of becoming aware of 



























In order to explore GPs’ views of their contribution to health care for persons with cancer, we 
started out looking for descriptions of how GPs perceived their place, and also which 
challenges and dilemmas they faced (Paper 1). The GPs saw themselves as the nearest doctor 
for their patients, also when the patients had cancer.  
 
The sense of being the nearest doctor had three aspects:  
The practical, the mediating and the personal  
 
Staying in a spatial image, we could say that the perceived place was to be 
- close by (the practical aspect)  
- between the patient and the clinic (the mediating aspect)  
- by the patient’s side (the personal aspect)  
 
In diagnosis, palliation and end-of –life care of cancer, the GPs worked from all three 
positions, each of them containing a manifold of tasks to be solved. Most GPs would have 
preferred to stay in touch with their patients also during the period of treatment and follow-up 
in hospital, but were not sure if the patients were in need of this. Some GPs wrote letters or 
called by phone in these periods, to tell that they were still there if the patients needed them, 
but they could be hesitant if this was right to do. The GPs especially wanted to secure that 
they met and got to know their patients personally before they were going to give end-of-life 
care in the patients’ home.  
 
The practical aspect included many concrete ways of being close at hand. The GPs wanted to 
be the first doctor to be called in case of symptoms, at any stage, a notion we called first aid. 
The notion of the GP as first aid was an expansion of the word’s colloquial meaning, and 
included all the clinical practical actions that the GPs undertook in order to alleviate their 
patients’ suffering. According to our interviewees, knowledge and skills in palliative 
treatment was quickly obtained in practice and should therefore not be regarded as an obstacle 
to be the nearest doctor. Relief of pain was seen as easy to learn, while alleviation of other 
symptoms like nausea or constipation could be more complicated. Especially elderly patients 
had to be asked directly for each possible symptom, as they would not always tell about their 
troubles. Simple palliative measures could augment life-quality considerably. A barrier to the 
work as first aid was that GPs were often not notified when their patients were discharged 
from hospital, and the discharge letter could arrive with a delay that in some cases was seen as 
hazardous by the GPs.  
 
The practical aspect also included being the nearest place for health service, like laboratory 
tests and decentralized treatments. This notion of being a local dispensary of health services 
we called corner shop. This aspect was particularly important in rural districts with a long 
distance to hospital, where some GP surgeries also offered simple cytostatic treatments. The 
practical aspect also included a function which could be seen as routine, but nevertheless 
important to patients; filling out forms, applications and medical certificates that gave right of 
sickness benefits etc. We called this function being a secretary. Many GPs also saw 
themselves as team workers; e.g. in a local palliative team. GPs talked about themselves as 
members, consultants, or leaders of local teams. We thought that the different ways of being a 
practical GP could be pulled together in the metaphor of the GP as an efficient handyman, 
dependent on dexterity, improvisation, learning by doing, prioritizing and planning ahead.  
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The GPs had various interfaces to mediate between: The everyday world and the clinical 
world, the patient’s story and the medical history, the patient and the hospital, amongst others. 
Interpreting was an important task at all interfaces, for example when the patient had received 
a cancer diagnosis at the hospital and came to the GP for a translation into an everyday and 
existential life context: What does this mean? The other way around, GPs had to translate the 
everyday troubles of their patients into a specific clinical language that gave the patients 
access to hospital care. Being an advocate for the patient was sometimes necessary, as the 
clinic was seen as an anonymous system and the GPs often felt a personal responsibility for 
their patients’ investigations. The GPs could also be asked by their patients for a second 
opinion regarding treatment in hospital. They saw themselves as someone in whom the 
patients had confidence, but they could lack the specific knowledge that the patients asked 
for. As interpreter, advocate and second opinion, the GP had to be a flexible mediator, using 
tools like asking advice, often from difficult-to-reach hospital colleagues.  
 
The personal aspect was seen as the most difficult, but also most rewarding aspect of being a 
GP. The GPs saw themselves as supporters, guides and consoling conversation partners for 
their patients with cancer. They depended on relation, respect and personal knowledge and 
used tools like offering time, listening and adjusting to the needs of the person and the 
situation. The collective term for this aspect of the GP was a touched companion. Exploring in 
depth the experiences of being a GP for people with cancer (Paper 2), we found a strong 
loyalty towards patients suffering from cancer, a stance that went beyond the normal duties. A 
strongly expressed dilemma for some GPs resulted from their position as mediators; when 
loyalty to the patient and family conflicted with loyalty to the system of the clinic and the 
judgement of specialist colleagues. Other matters of judgement regarded the degree of honesty 
about the prognosis and whether death should be openly spoken of. The greatest challenge for 
some GPs was how to help patients who were afraid to die. Human beings themselves, the 
GPs own feelings about death could be activated. The notion of shared humanness also 
pointed to how GPs got personally and emotionally involved with the patients and their 
family and how this involvement often lacked a closure when the patient died. We chose the 
ironic notion of dealing with small things, a GP’s  own words, as an expression of how GPs’ 
work; the practical, the mediating and the personal, might be seen if medicine is viewed as a 
hierarchy with specialized, clinic-based biomedicine at the top.  
 
One of the crucial points in the GPs’ stories was about diagnosing cancer; of coming to think 
of it, and not overseeing it, in the first place. In the expanding research field of early cancer 
diagnosis, there has been a focus on epidemiological studies aiming at refining the predictive 
value of single symptoms, which again can be used as a basis for guidelines about alarm 
symptoms and red flags. Exploring more broadly how the thought of cancer arises during a 
consultation (Paper 3), we found that practising such basic knowledge was one way the GPs 
might become aware of cancer in a consultation. However, there were other contexts of 
attention, in which the thought of cancer could arise. One was about interpersonal awareness, 
of being alert to changes in the patients’ appearance or behaviour and of cues in their choice 
of words, on a background of basic knowledge, experience and often personal knowing. 
Another context of awareness was intuitive knowing, a tacit feeling of alarm which could be 
difficult to verbalize, but nevertheless was helpful. Intuition built on the earlier mentioned 
contexts: Basic knowledge, experience and interpersonal awareness. The existential context of 
awareness, which we called ‘fearing cancer’, could affect the thoughts of both doctor and 
patient during a consultation, and thus the challenge could be how not to think about cancer 
all the time, or finding ways for both patient and doctor of living with the insecurity without 
becoming over-precautious.  
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DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
GPs’ practical cancer care in the community 
This thesis aims to tell health care professionals and researchers, including GPs themselves, 
about how a group of interviewed Norwegian GPs view their work in cancer care. Asking for 
stories about actual patients and how GPs were involved during the courses of illness, our 
focus was not on general opinions but on experiences of having cared for individual patients 
over time.  
 
Paper 1 was intended to give an overview on the GPs work in cancer care. We thought it 
would be useful for collaborating clinicians, home care nurses and for patients to know more 
about how GPs view their contribution to cancer care. The main message to all of them is that 
these GPs saw themselves as the nearest doctor, also when their patients had cancer. When the 
patients were “away”, attending hospital for treatment or follow-up, this was thought of by the 
GPs as a temporal departure from primary care. It was mainly during this departure that the 
GPs were unsure of their possible contribution.  
 
I found it fruitful to divide the tasks that the GPs saw for themselves into the three main 
aspects of the practical, the mediating and the personal. How do these terms compare to other 
attempts in the literature to make overviews of GPs work in cancer care, seen from the GPs 
own perspective? Groot et al (2005) summarize from their focus group study with Dutch GPs 
that in palliative care, GPs performed a mixture of somatic, psychosocial and coordinating 
tasks and that barriers experienced in daily palliative care were on a personal, relational and 
organizational level. Field (1998) found that communicative, organisational and clinical skills, 
just as relationship and a holistic view of the person, were important for GPs’ work with all 
patients, including patients with cancer. Compared to both Field and Groot et al, our three 
main aspects are wider and include more elements from the many tasks that GPs see for 
themselves in cancer care. 
 
While we described a broad range of tasks that the GPs were involved in, not all of these have 
been mentioned and discussed in the GP-literature before. These include the notion of being a 
local dispensary of health services which we called corner shop, and also the GP as a 
secretary. The latter was a term for filling out forms, referrals, certificates and reports, 
suggested by one of the participants. She did not refer to it in a pejorative sense, but rather as 
one of the necessary things that had to be done, and that should be easy for the patients to get 
done, without the GP making much fuss about it. The corner shop service of GPs in some 
rural parts of Norway giving cycles of simple cytostatic treatment might be quite unique in the 
world. Chemotherapy in the community was given either by cancer nurses in cottage 
hospitals, or by the GPs themselves in their surgeries. Especially the latter was, according to 
our participants, a fragile service based on local enthusiasm, without the necessary practical 
and financial support from the health care system.  
 
Inter-professional enthusiasm to establish good cancer care in the local community seemed to 
be a driving force at several of the places I visited. The GPs at these places could speak with 
admiration about their collaborating partners. This could be nurses at the local nursing home 
where some patients with advanced cancer would live; it could be cancer nurses or district 
nurses that worked in peoples’ homes, or local physiotherapists and occupational therapists. 
There was often a pride regarding what the local health services might achieve, on the team 
level and the organizational level. The GPs in Field’s study (1998) were worried to loose 
control of patient care to hospital based palliative care services, as they felt that they had the 
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best knowledge about the patients and their families. Secondary care palliative teams are 
about to be introduced in Norway at the moment. When I did the interviews in the fall of 
2007, this had not been initiated, so I could not ask the participants about their experiences of 
shared care. Anyhow, several of participants were located so far from a hospital that they 
would probably not be able to work with a palliative team. They will still have to rely on their 
local team and their own competence.  
 
I was surprised that the GPs, even the youngest one with only one year of professional 
experience after internship, seemed to feel quite competent regarding palliative treatment. 
Several said explicitly that they felt treatment of pain was easy. Some said that they had 
learned this well in medical school, others were grateful about using a palliative online 
handbook and all had learned from experience and discussing with colleagues. Relieving 
other symptoms than pain, like nausea or constipation was regarded more difficult. These 
findings are in line with other studies. Jones (1993) found that pain was seen as well 
controlled by family carers of people with cancer dying at home, but other symptoms was 
seen as less well relieved.  
 
The overall impression from our study is that palliative competence was seen as grounded in 
medical school and then developed in practice; learning by doing, learning from colleagues, 
and learning from patients. Mitchell (2002) found that many GPs had low confidence in their 
own palliative care competence, but that both involvement and confidence in palliative care 
augmented with years of experience. While von Hanno (2000) found that only a minority of 
GPs viewed their competence in pain relief as good enough, in Anvik et al (2006), many GPs 
felt comfortable with palliative care and found ways of obtaining the knowledge they needed, 
for example from specialists. Also in our study, most participants seemed to have confidence 
in their palliative competence. Generally, our participants focused on making everything 
possible, for example so that patients could die at home, and talked little about barriers to 
palliative care. Lack of knowledge or lack of experience was rarely mentioned as a barrier. 
Our interpretation was that knowledge and experience in this field, included being a personal 
companion at the end of life, was mainly seen as something one obtains through practice. The 
message from Anvik et al and also from our study is that an initial lack of knowledge and 
experience should not stop GPs from engaging in palliative care.  
 
The time around discharge from hospital has been characterized by patients as being left alone 
(Ervik et al., 2010; Kendall et al., 2006). It is also a critical time for GPs, as at this point, they 
might have taken over the care of the patient with cancer, without having been notified and 
informed. Norwegian hospitals normally do not admit patients without a letter of referral, and 
in the case of emergencies, also a telephone call from the GP to the doctor on call. However, 
patients can be discharged from hospital to primary care without any of these forms of 
immediate communication. As one of the interviewees remarked; the GP is the only non-
anonymous actor in Norwegian health care. The medical responsibility for the patient in 
primary care is personified, while in secondary care the recipient is an anonymous system. 
Examples of this in our material were referral letters that disappeared and departments that 
disagreed about whose responsibility the patient was. Our interviewees had the impression 
their patients’ hospital care could be fragmented. Professor Per Fugelli (2010) coined the term 
‘disposable doctors’, referring to the many doctors that patients meet only once during a 
course of illness, and advocated that chronically ill people should have their personal hospital 
doctor, just as they have their personal GP. Such a doctor could also be a collaboration partner 
for the patient’s GP. 
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As noted also in Groot et al (2005) and Field (1998), the competences needed for a GP in 
palliative care are very broad. The challenges in cancer care for the interviewed GPs seemed 
to be mainly in two fields, namely as mediators between the patient and the hospital and as 
personal companions of people at the end of life. On a superficial level, one might say that in 
both these fields, the issue is at stake is ‘communication’. It is noteworthy that this technical 
term was rarely used in the interviews. To understand what is at stake when GPs act as 
mediators, we should rather consider the different perspectives of medicine that are favoured 
by working in general practice and in a hospital, see Introduction.  To comprehend the 
challenges of being a personal doctor for a patient at the end of life, we suggest departing 
from the notion of shared humanness. 
 
 
Theoretical issues rising from the study 
 
The physician is concerned … (unlike a naturalist)…with a single organism, the 
human subject, striving to preserve its identity in adverse circumstances  
   (McKenzie, 1927: 532). 
 
 
I will attempt to see the results of this thesis in light of a wider discussion on what medicine 
and general practice is about. For the reader, it might be unaccustomed to find long citations 
from other authors at this stage of a thesis. This was, however, the way I had to go to insert 
the study into a broader theoretical context. While Paper 1 gave a pragmatic overview, Paper 
2 went into the dept of the doctor-patient relationship. The latter paper already has a quite 
comprehensive discussion of the personal aspect of doctoring. Starting from the very first 
moments of the consultation, Paper 3 touched only briefly upon several theoretical 
considerations from the introduction, which could merit further discussion.  
 
Human beings are reflective, meaning-seeking, relational and purposeful organisms (Getz et 
al., 2011). The biographical experiences of persons are inscribed, for good and for bad, deep 
into the flesh of the human body (Kirkengen, 2001). However, in illness humans often 
experience that the flesh, their body-as-nature, go against them in a meaningless way 
(Rudebeck, 2012). Primordially, medicine is a meeting, a consultation, between a human 
being asking for advice and another human being, whose knowledge and experience is 
expected to be helpful. Within the frames of today’s comprehensive and highly specialized 
health services with advanced technological mediations; this original core of medicine has to 
be excavated in each clinical encounter.  
 
Paper 3 dealt with retrospective interviews about such encounters in general practice, as 
remembered and recounted by GPs. For the interviewer, these were stories about cases of 
possible cancer, according to her research question. For the participants, the stories were 
about their patients, people they knew; with names, faces, families and life stories, and about 
themselves, as professionals and persons. What the interviewer could possibly grasp of the 
doctors’ stories was necessarily limited. Just like a doctor chasing a presumed disease 
concealed in the patient’s body, the interviewer seemed to be pursuing a hidden thought in the 
doctor’s head. Her questions might be heard as stubbornly purposeful: What made you think 
about cancer, or other serious disease, in this case?  
 
The truth was that the GPs were not always able to tell. In some stories it was easy, at least in 
afterthought, to say that the patient had had some alarming symptoms or signs; reminiscent of 
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a textbook model. But what about all the other stories; where did the thought come from? We 
know that out of the richness of perceptions, interactions, feelings and associations in a 
human encounter, only a small part will be consciously attended to and lend itself to 
verbalization. However, all the subconsciously perceived impressions do not get lost; they 
play tacitly into our judgments. We know more than we can tell (Polanyi, 1983).  
 
Just as the interviews in Paper 3 about the thought of cancer were constructed in the relation 
between interviewer and participant, the diagnostic ideas they tried to recall arose in the 
relation between doctor and patient. And before deciding to consult, the patients had had 
encounters with themselves, and often with significant others, trying to interpret their 
unfamiliar bodily experiences. Thus, prior to my analysis, there had been a sequence of 
hermeneutic moments (Leder, 1990a), and for each of them only a small part of the richness 
of perceptions, interactions, feelings and associations had been consciously accessible and 
possible to verbalize.  
 
The interpretative task of the doctor is twofold, according to Rudebeck (2012). Trying to 
understand the patient’s experience is always the primary, as long as the situation is not 
immediately acute and life threatening. The meaning of the patient’s experience is not 
necessarily explained by biomedical science. Likewise, empathy with the patient does not 
develop automatically from questions directed at the nature of diseases. First, the doctor must 
overcome the intersubjective gap of knowledge, which is valid for all human contact: How 
can she be sure that the patient experiences what she perceives that he experiences? 
Formulating bodily experiences into words can be very difficult. The doctor should help the 
patient express what he feels and thinks about. At this stage, Rudebeck says, the patient’s own 
recognition of the experienced is most important. The doctor should try to enter into the 
patient’s story, without judging or listening selectively to descriptions sounding like disease. 
Then she could compare to her own experience as a bodily and conscious being, included the 
special preconditions of being a doctor. Thus, Rudebeck (2001) encourages the doctor not 
only to observe how the patient presents his symptoms, but to share his experiences, through 
interpersonal imagination; also called empathy.  
 
Do doctors normally do this? According to the observations of Agledahl et al (2010), doctors, 
including GPs, generally do not attempt to share their patients’ concerns, but quickly pick out 
information from the patient’s story that they consider clinically relevant. That is, doctors tend 
to concentrate from the beginning of the consultation on the construction of a medical story. 
But even observing has its limitations, as subtle interchanges between persons might escape 
the analytic gaze of the researcher. 
 
Interestingly, Rudebeck (2002) wrote:  
 
An observer — at least not on video — may not even perceive it. But whether I accept 
the patient’s invitation to share her experience, or whether I choose to dismantle the 
possible disease piece by piece, is a choice between two very different realities. And it 
is a choice made in a millisecond (p.452). 
 
This could be a choice between turning the attention directly towards possible diseases and 
keeping the attention on the person who comes to seek advice. A holistic view of medicine 
does not mean for the doctor to see ‘the whole person’, which is impossible. It means meeting 
the person without an inner cleft, without seeing him as just a body sending messages about 
its condition (Rudebeck 2012). Symptoms do not go visit the doctor. What a doctor listens to 
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are not the symptoms, but a patient’s symptom presentations (Rudebeck, 1991). The symptom 
presentation is an account of lived experience, rather than a correlate of bodily derangement. 
The physical body of the patient cannot speak for itself, without human emotion and 
reflection (Rudebeck, 2002).  
 
The first interpretative step of the doctor; attempting to understand the experience of not 
feeling well, regardless of the cause, is the specialty of the general practitioner, according to 
Rudebeck (2012). Often, the first step suffices; both patient and doctor might realize in a flash 
that the problem belongs to life and not to medicine (Balint & Norell, 1973). Only secondly 
comes the other interpretive task of the doctor; the scientific gap of knowledge: How can she 
objectively verify the patient’s experience?  
 
Hunter (1991) is also concerned about the double importance of the patient’s story:  
 
The patient’s story is not only the raw material for medical interpretation but a thing 
in itself. It is the presentation of the patient’s illness experience (an often an epitome 
of a life) and not merely the precursor of the medical “truth”. The physician’s 
recognition of this is narrative’s first contribution to medicine’s healing task (p.132). 
 
My interpretation of Hunter is that because the patient tells about his bodily experience from 
within a life, the eventual bodily derangement which the physician finds should also be seen 
in the context of that life, both when the patient is informed about the physician’s medical 
interpretation of his story, and also when planning possible treatment together with the 
patient. It follows that shared decision-making in medicine will only find its full meaning 
when the original problem of the patient was also shared, or at least acknowledged in its 
context, the patient’s life.  
 
Fearing cancer was a category of description in paper 3. A symptom might be so worrying 
that the patient’s life feels changed. What has become evident then is the factual condition of 
human life, of being a vulnerable and finite bodily existence. Professionally, this is the 
doctor’s home ground and power base. Medicine works in the ambiguity between the most 
private and the most general. Biomedicine deals with the general while the doctor is faced 
also with the private and existential (Rudebeck, 2012). As human beings, patient and doctor 
share these conditions. Through this shared humanness the doctor can be capable of 
understanding the patient, and through bodily empathy she has the possibility of sharing the 
patient’s vulnerability. The better the doctor knows herself, the further imagination could lead 
her towards the patient.  
 
My glands, my openings, my death are my most private things, and yet they are my 
most general. This paradox is the bridge on which doctor and patient meet. 
Biomedical expertise is the difference between doctor and patient, but the more that 
GPs exert their expertise in terms of bodily empathy, the more equal are the doctor 
and patient, and the more the patient feels to be seen (Rudebeck, 2002:452). 
 
 
In paper 3, we did not discuss empathy, but used the concept of interpersonal awareness (Hall, 
2011) which seemed closer to the interviews. Interpersonal awareness might be seen as the 
step before empathy; embracing the attentive presence and passive receptiveness that 
contributes to clinical sensibility (Nortvedt, 2008) in the consultation.  
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Direct questions about empathy were not included in the interview guide due to the equivocal 
meaning of the concept. Today, also in medicine, empathy has mainly an emotional 
connotation. The original meaning of the German philosophical concept of Einfühlung 
included perceptions, emotions and cognitions; which are integrated dimensions of any 
experience (Rudebeck, 2002). This original meaning of empathy would fit well for the first 
interpretative step of the doctor. Reidar Pedersen also suggests this in his thesis (2010), where 
he, in line with philosophical hermeneutics, defines empathy as ‘an appropriate understanding 
of the patient’. Surprisingly, he does not comment on the German philosopher Edith Stein 
(1891- 1942), whose work on empathy could be relevant for an investigation of the doctor’s 
interpreting task.  
 
Empathy, according to the interpretation Thomassen (2000) does of Stein (1989), happens 
when I turn towards another person. The other’s feeling, of for example sadness, pulls me 
towards him, so that I end up side by side with him, at the same place of experience. I do not 
grasp the other’s experience, I am grasped by it. I am touched by someone else than myself, 
who make himself known. Empathy is an experience integrating knowledge and emotion, 
separateness and shared experience. Without empathy I would have been trapped in the world 
as it appears to me. Trough empathy I overcome my own perspective of the world and 
experience an intersubjectively available, existing world. According to Stein, empathy is the 
only way to reach the other as a living human being, and not as just a physical thing. Stein 
maintains that empathy is a direct and irreducible act that brakes down the distinction between 
the exterior and interior. Empathy precedes and preconditions cognitive acts like inference, 
assessment and comparison, connecting emotion and knowledge on a more basic level.  
 
If this is what happens when two people meet, it certainly should happen also between doctor 
and patient. Otherwise, the patient would just be a physical thing to the doctor. But is that not 
what many patients complain about – that they do not feel recognized and treated like human 
beings by doctors? Is this because doctors often omit what Rudebeck calls their first 
interpretive task, and foremost commit themselves to the physical thing, the body-as-nature, 
which is also the matter they have studied during most of their education? Medical school 
does not only mediate knowledge but also patterns of thought and action. Within seconds of 
the patient’s story, the doctor starts thinking about possible diagnoses. Rudebeck (2012) calls 
this ‘the biomedical reflex’ which convenient in acute situations, when the seconds count. 
Otherwise ‘the biomedical reflex’ might be disturbing, because it seems to overrule the 
natural human attitude, which would be the empathic stance towards the other as a human 
being.  
 
In paper 3, we saw something like ‘the biomedical reflex’ as the first context of awareness for 
thought of cancer to arise. Logically, interpersonal awareness is the context for all human 
interaction and would therefore precede the more specific professional attention to alarming 
symptoms. And maybe fearing cancer should have been the second category, as it brings so 
many people to their GP and also many GPs to refer their patients on. Then we would have 
practicing basic knowledge as the third category and finally intuitive knowing at last, but not 
least. Intuition is supposed to integrate different forms of knowledge (Plessner et al., 2008; 
Polanyi, 1969), (in our case: biomedical science, clinical skills, professional and personal 
experience and interpersonal awareness), and might be seen as the highest form of knowledge 
(Larsson, 1892).   
 
Here it may be necessary to state more precisely that the patient does not come to the doctor 
to be generally understood as a person, but to get a professional advice about a problem which 
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he himself has defined as within the realm of illness, otherwise he would not go to a doctor. 
Hunter (1991) depicts the doctor’s task as threefold: 1. To acknowledge the patient’s 
subjective experience – the patient’s story. 2. To formulate it as a medical version, matching 
taxonomic abstractions and biomedical laws – the doctor’s story. 3. To return that 
interpretation back to the patient, ‘still to understand and affirm the life narrative of which it is 
now a part’ (p. 147).  
 
It seems that the doctor’s first interpretative task (the patient’s story) has another ontological 
and epistemological status than the second task (the doctor’s formulation of a medical story). 
While the first rests on the assumption that humans are relational beings sharing a common, 
intersubjective, everyday world and thus can understand each other empathetically, the second 
rests on a clinical ontology seeing diseases as real, physical entities that have invaded the 
patient’s body, revealing themselves as ‘clinical pictures’ for the doctor to recognize.  
 
The patient presents himself as a patient, a sufferer, in the expectation (the hope, the 
dread) that the physician, an expert, will detect characteristic features, perceive him 
as a “case”, for it is only when a “case” has been delineated (…) that an appropriate 
“treatment” can be suggested. Thus the first act of medicine is to listen to a personal 
story, extract or abstract from it a (…) “case”, and exclaim “Migraine!”, and 
“Parkinsonism!” with all that this implies (Sacks, 1986:17).  
 
In biomedicine, the classical symptoms of disease are the patient experiences that have high 
status. Not their particular character gives them status, but the fact that they can be attributed 
to a specific disease. The patient is expected to confirm biomedical theory through their 
symptoms (otherwise symptoms might be seen as vague). Diagnosing such classical 
symptoms and attributing them to a specific disease has a high status for the doctor; it makes 
her a ‘real doctor’ (O’Flynn & Britten, 2006; Rudebeck, 2012). Such classical and high status 
experiences are relatively rare in general practice, both for patients and doctors. Maybe that is 
why general practice has been a low status specialization in medicine, and why many patients 
demand to be referred to higher status specialists, hoping to be diagnosed with ditto diseases?  
 
Hunter (1991), in line with Sacks, recognizes that the ill person undergoes an 
impersonalization, necessary to the medical interpretation of illness.  
 
The act of becoming a “patient” is itself a first step in assuming a nonpersonal, 
medicalized identity. The translation of the patient’s story into the medical discourse 
involves the substitution of the case for the person: the patient is impersonalized, 
represented in the medical arena by an objectifying medical narrative. This 
generalizing view of the individual aids diagnosis and may even offer the patient some 
comfort.  (…) The case narrative that represents the patient to the medical world 
comes in that world to be the patient (p. 134-5).  
 
The case as a stand-in for the patient in medical problem-solving can be useful. Patients hope 
to be recognized as a case not only because of the prospects of treatment. The diagnosis is a 
recognition of the patients’ own experience (Rudebeck, 2012) and an explanation of what is 
happening to them. To get to know the truth about one’s predicament can help people to 
preserve a sense of control (Hunter 1991). For this sake, people are willing to undress and 
open up their bodies and lives to medical scrutiny. Hunter suggests that people accept their 
medical objectification in an act of trust:  
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We undergo this impersonalization trusting in the privileged nature of the patient-
physician relationship – what is discovered will be held in confidence – and in the 
common humanity of the physician who, we presume, will recognize in us a fellow 
creature asking on this occasion for help (p. 133). 
 
Here, Hunter takes the patient’s perspective, suggesting that his trust relates both to the 
institutional level, the ethical and juridical obligations of, amongst other, professional secrecy, 
and also to a perceived moral obligation emerging immediately from the shared humanness of 
doctor and patient. To be recognized as a fellow creature, a human being, might mean to be 
seen as more than a case or a physical thing, as Stein explained, through the act of empathy. 
The many reports about patients who wanted to be recognized in this way (Arborelius & 
Bremberg, 1992; Frederiksen et al., 2009; Kvåle & Bondevik, 2008; Thorne et al., 2005) 
suggest that, in Rudebeck’s words (personal communication), when a patient is treated as an 
object, it becomes much more difficult to be an object.   
 
Seeing the patient as ‘a case of …’ might be a pragmatic and useful bridge between shared 
humanity and professional objectivity, as long as it is recognized as a medical construct rather 
than a natural object. Further reification of the patient as being the diagnosis or the disease 
itself might be characterized as an ontological and epistemological collapse, a metonymy of 
person and disease, which has only harmful effects for both patient and doctor. When nothing 
more can be done against the disease, treatment might be seen as a failure, the doctor’s work 
as over, and the patient might end up abandoned (Hunter 1991).  
 
The tendency to see the patient as an object with only a medical existence and only a 
diagnostic meaning (…) fosters avoidance or automatic, unfeeling care, and, by 
precluding careful observation, it makes possible, even probable, inadequate 
treatment and misunderstanding of further symptoms. The patient in effect is deserted. 
The living spirit is ignored in its reduction to a morbid body. Not only do physicians 
loose their patients, first to inattention and then to death, they are deprived of 
restorative contact that can validate their life work and the possibility of further 
learning (Hunter, 1991:137-8).  
 
Why does this collapse, the reification of the patient, happen? Hunter (1991) thinks it is 
mainly due to physicians’ need for emotional protection. Why then do doctors, also in our 
study, feel that accompanying patients with incurable cancer until their death is meaningful 
and rewarding? Agledahl (2011) acknowledges that objectification of the patient is necessary 
in medicine, which I agree to. Further, she suggests that attending to the existential meaning 
of illness is not a medical issue and not necessarily the doctor’s task. Because rejecting the 
patient as a fellow human being in this way is a moral offence, doctors should excuse 
themselves to their patients for not treating them as human beings. In this line of argument, 
medicine is seen as what doctors are observed to be doing, and as a practice that intrinsically 
leaves a moral residue.  
 
From the stories that the GPs participating in our study told, it seemed that they viewed the 
doctor’s first and second interpretative task as connected. They saw the translation of the 
doctor’s story back to the patient’s story as necessary, and acknowledged how biomedical 
issues were connected to existential concerns. Having a continual, personal and contextual 
knowledge of patients was of great value to the GPs in our study. Our participants also valued 
the relational effects they could have on their patients. Listening to the patient as a fellow 
human being was explicitly mentioned as a supportive measure. Simultaneously, some of 
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them suggested that these values have a low status in medicine and that GPs sometimes seem 
to deal with ‘small things’. Whether the GPs succeeded with putting their values into life in 
their encounters with patients, or not, cannot be inferred from our interview study.  
 
A deficiency in developing and discussing epistemology on a broad basis, beyond 
philosophical journals, might be an explanation for patients’ reification and for the lack of 
attention to human relation in medicine. Medicine leans itself theoretically on the natural 
sciences, and within the natural sciences, it leans to the positivistic side. It leans itself more 
towards the reductionist view that the secrets of life can be found on a molecular level, than 
seeing the human being as a biological whole, an organism. Further, medicine leans itself 
more towards objectivism, the ideal of scientific detachment, than acknowledging the 
indispensable personal participation of the knower in the shaping of knowledge (Polanyi, 
1962). Moreover, medicine emphasizes explicit, so-called evidence based knowledge, and 
underrates the basic importance of tacit and practical knowledge, knowing-how. Furthermore, 
the significance of seeing the human being as a sentient, reflective and purposeful being is not 
fully recognized. Thus, knowledge and discussions from the human and social sciences, even 
from a closely related discipline like psychology are not always seen as relevant for medicine. 
The effect of this ‘thin epistemology’ (Zhenua, 2006) is that the human person is not 
consistently regarded in medicine; the molecules are, to borrow an expression from Fugelli 
(2010), often left alone. And even if the human person was totally insignificant for biological 
restoration and survival rates after for example cancer treatment, it would always be very 
significant for human suffering, which is what medicine is supposed to alleviate.  
 
What can doctors mean to their patients with cancer then, on the relational level? In our study 
they saw themselves as being companions, guides, supporters and consolers. What might this 
mean to patients? Salander (2002) found that from the perspective of patients newly 
diagnosed with cancer, receiving bad news was not an event, but a process in which 
relationships with doctors and nurses were seen as protection from the threat of danger to their 
lives. Relationship, and not the information as such, influenced the patients’ degree of hope.  
In a theoretical article, Salander et al (1999) elucidate this by applying Winnicott’s (1971) 
theory about the ‘intermediate area’. This mental area ‘enables us to assign a meaning to 
reality that is in accordance with our psychological needs’ (1999: 83), acknowledged in 
creative activities like play, art and culture. Unconsciously, the doctor and other medical staff 
might be seen by the patient as a protectors against death. The protection is according to 
Salander et al mediated primarily by non-verbal means, like closeness and touch, and a 
symbolic ‘framing structure’ of order that facilitates trust and hope: Availability, continuity 
and predictability.  
 
Salander et al (1999) suggest that information concerning diagnosis and treatment also belong 
to ‘framing’ for the patient. The essence of this information can for the patient be: “I am not 
left alone – there is someone out there who understands my exposed position, who has put 
her- or himself between myself and death, with the power to assist. I’ve come to the right 
place” (1999:85). Clinical dialogues might also be seen as an environment facilitating the 
process of patients’ psychological survival and reconstruction of reality, by allowing space for 
patients’ positive illusions (Salander et al 1999). Doctors should not give patients false 
prospects, but they should also avoid the closing of doors, by giving more definite 
information about prognosis than the patient asks for. Also, giving bad news without giving 
ideas of possible treatment is a way of closing the door and leaving the patient alone, exposed 




Looking back on paper 2, I recognize a sensitivity that many GPs voiced towards the question 
of honesty, through awaiting patients’ readiness to talk about prognosis and weighing each 
word carefully. The GPs seemed to acknowledge the need of adjusting the information about 
prognosis to people’s capability of making sense of them in their creation of hope. In paper 1, 
several of the tools that the GPs used for their work in cancer care could be seen as creating a 
framing structure for patients, like planning ahead, staying accessible, being comprehensive, 
and offering time. This was a way the GPs said they preferred to organize their work. It may 
be called ‘an organization for relationship’, containing 
 
the promise in your attentiveness that you’ll be there, and the declaration in your 









































DISCUSSION OF METHOD 
 
The generalizability or transferability that might originate from a qualitative study is not 
dependent on a certain procedure for sampling of participants or the size of the study 
population. It is created through the qualitative analysis itself, by virtue of a depth 
understanding of the data. Firstly, this understanding is dependent on a theory level applied in 
the analysis; the theoretical concepts chosen by the researcher as appropriate to explore the 
phenomenon in question. Secondly, it is dependent on the validity obtained in the analytic 
process; the process of applying, probing and developing these chosen concepts during the 
analysis. Accordingly, the basis of transferability in a qualitative analysis is theoretical 
(Jørgensen, 1995). On the background of Jørgensen’s arguments, I want to critically discuss 
the potential of generalization from this thesis, and to acknowledge methodological problems. 
 
The epistemological assumptions that played into the design of the first study (papers 1 and 2) 
were outlined in the Introduction. Summarized, we departed from an interpretative paradigm. 
The theoretical considerations and the background literature presented in the Introduction 
were only partly present at the time of creating the first interview guide. Prior to interviewing, 
we had not chosen specific theoretical concepts for the study. This could be called an open, 
explorative design valuing descriptions, immediate interpretations and the development of 
concepts during the analysis in an inductive fashion (Jørgensen, 1995). It could also be 
characterized as yet another a-theoretical, utilitarian study from general practice (Jaye, 2002). 
On this background, our concepts were inductively developed. Later, we discussed the 
possibility of contributing to ‘a theory of general practice’, drawing on authors like 
McWhinney, Malterud and Rudebeck.  
 
Concepts should be selected on the basis of their ability to ‘unlock’ the text and give new 
insights into the coherence of meaning. Qualis means how, and precisely to detect how this 
coherence constructed is the goal of a qualitative analysis. The researcher looks for a 
conceptual or theoretical structure at work in the text. These concepts should be developed 
with a ‘daring imagination’, aiming at a new or a more nuanced understanding of the 
phenomenon, while still communicating with earlier studies in the field. The concepts should 
be enriched by the insights attainable in the analysis, and leave the analysis with a revived 
assertive force. Through a systematic evaluation of the possible explanative power of the 
concepts, the analysis aims to make probable that the presented understanding is documented 
and plausible. A step-wise elaboration of the depth structure and coherence hidden in the text, 
and an argumentation in favour of this structure, should establish plausibility.  
 
In Methodological considerations, I presented the analytic steps for each of the papers, for 
example content analysis for paper 1. Such a step-wise procedural description is often a 
requirement when presenting a qualitative analysis. However, it is quite a technical 
description of rules. It compares to a doctor adhering to a model of, say, ‘the seven phases in 
the consultation’ when encountering a patient. Neither a step-wise analysis nor going through 
certain phases in the consultation secures the quality of the dialogues between the researcher 
and the text or the doctor and the patient. . In Jørgensen’s view, the researcher should identify 
a concept as giving an accurate description of a passage in the text through ‘feeling-into’ the 
text. We recognize this as a translation of them German term Einfühlung. It is interesting to 
note that Polanyi called this ‘indwelling’ (Zenhua, 2006), and also that he thought that this 
was the method of choice for all science. After the Einfühlung, however, the researcher 
should define the criteria for identifying a concept in the text (Jørgensen, 1995). This 
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operationalizing might compare to the second interpretive task of the doctor: How can she 
credibly verify the patient’s experience.   
 
When presenting our results in paper 1, we chose an extended use of metaphors, trying to 
evoke new images of what it means to be a GP for people with cancer. While scientific 
terminology is often abstract, the work of a doctor is, at first look, quite concrete and 
perceptible, using the ears, the eyes and the hands. As a practitioner coming into research, this 
level was what I first recognized in the GPs’ stories, and in the first paper, the categories were 
mainly on this manifest level. We picked several terms from everyday language, like corner 
shop or handyman, which might seem unusual for a scientific paper. However, in presenting 
GPs as, for example, the handymen of healthcare, we hoped to bring about a broader 
understanding regarding what GPs’ work might be about and the challenges they might face, 
also on the literally manual level. Being comprehensive or being all-round would be other 
possible expressions, lacking the tangibility and dexterity of the handyman. A limitation of 
using metaphors and self-invented colloquial concepts instead of existing terminology is that 
comparison to other studies might be difficult.  
 
In paper 2, we wanted to go in depth into the challenges of being a GP for people with cancer 
over time, which meant that we would have to concentrate on a few themes. Within a rich 
interview material touching on many themes, how did we choose the ones to analyse? Firstly, 
I looked for vehemence in the GPs own evaluations of the narratives they told, assuming that 
in these stories, an important issue would be at stake. Secondly, I noted how many times such 
an issue were thematized across the interviews. Thus, I used both a sense of the strength of 
feelings expressed in the story by the GP as an indicator pointing towards a value at stake, and 
the quantitative distribution of the these themes. Herby I wanted to promote correspondence 
between text and interpretation; aiming to prevent a selective interpretation of the text 
according to my own assumptions and values. The result of this process was the selection of 
the three themes loyalty, honesty and shared humanness, and the differentiation of the 
nuances and variations in the meanings of these themes across the interviews.  
 
After identifying concepts and exploring their correspondence within the text, the researcher 
should according to Jørgensen look for coherence between the concepts. Hereby, there is a 
possibility of unveiling a deeper structure in the text. The researcher might face the very 
special experience of gaining a new understanding, of seeing an interrelationship that never 
has been comprehended before. In paper 1, the coherence was created through a search for 
relations and divisions between the different tasks that the GPs told about. The experience of 
discovering such a perceived pattern, through dialogue with the transcripts and with the 
supervisor, was very inspiring. In paper 2, the process was different. Loyalty, honesty and 
shared humanness can be seen as sub-themes of the overarching theme which we explored in 
this paper, namely the doctor-patient relationship. The search for coherence between the 
themes might be seen as aiming to understand why precisely these three aspects of a clinical 
relationship were emphasized in the interviews and if there could be a common explanation 
for the tensions within them. The notion of shared humanness pointed both to the naked fact 
beneath the white coat, and to the neglected basis of a clinical relationship. A hierarchy of 
medical knowledge, leaving GPs’ relational and contextual knowledge of patients at the lower 
end, was suggested as a breeding ground for conflicts of loyalty. Honesty was also discussed 
in relation to a similar hierarchy, in which biomedical interventions aimed at curing diseases 
seemed to be valued higher than palliative caring and attending to the existential suffering of 
persons. Thus, the coherence of concepts in paper 2 seemed to be at work in the tension 
between different ontologies of medicine, leaving GPs in a squeezed position.  
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In phenomenography, the coherence between concepts is presented in a structure called 
outcome space. The discussion of paper 3 aimed at developing the outcome space through 
elaborating the interrelations between the four categories of description. In the paper basic 
knowledge was the most fundamental category. The logical consequence of the theoretical 
discussion above would be to put interpersonal awareness at the basis for all human 
interaction, also the clinical encounter. However, because the ‘biomedical reflex’ is so strong 
in doctors, the sequence chosen in the paper might be quite realistic.  
 
Viewing the thesis in its entirety, one question was what its adequate title should be. Was 
there a key concept that could open up for an understanding of the whole? I chose ‘A doctor 
close at hand’ as a title after some consideration. It expresses important values for the GPs 
like access, availability and proximity. It alludes to both a literal and a figurative meaning and 
points to both the tangible and the supportive work of the GP.  
 
Limitations of the study  
As discussed by many authors, the validity of a study is constructed through all phases of the 
research process, starting with the relevance of the research question. In the Introduction, I 
aimed for transparency in describing the design and the steps taken. Before drawing any 
conclusions from this thesis, I would like to discuss the sampling strategy in more depth. 
When considering the possibility of transferability, is important to consider the degree of 
similarity, the ‘fittingness’ between the context the analysis draws on and the context it is 
supposed to be transferred to (Lincoln & Cuba, 1985).  
 
Patton (2002) describes 15 strategies for purposeful sampling, which have in common the 
underlying principle of selecting information-rich cases. This was also the rationale behind 
the sampling done for this study, see details in the Introduction. There was self selection of 
GPs who took part in a survey and opted for an interview and then a further selection of the 
survey-responses that indicated involvement by the GPs. This highly selective group might 
compare to what Patton calls Intensity sampling, consisting of cases that manifest the 
phenomenon of interest intensely (but not extremely, as in Extreme or deviant case sampling). 
Within this group there was then attempted a maximum variation (heterogeneity) sampling, 
aiming at including both male and female GPs with varying professional experience working 
in both urban and rural areas, resulting in an overweight of rural practitioners. The resulting 
sample turned out to be a group of GPs who seemed to be highly committed in cancer care; 
possibly they were generally very committed in their work. In paper 1, I suggested that the 
informants pointed to the opportunities, and that generalization was possible at the level of 
what could be possible in general practice. Due to the sampling strategy, we lack more 
information about barriers to cancer care in general practice and we also do not know why 
some GPs hardly take part in palliative home care. In paper 2, the three themes of loyalty, 
honesty and shared humanity were voiced by the same committed doctors. However, although 
the examples analyzed are from dedicated practice, the relevance of the concepts for 
understanding what it means to be a GP for a person with cancer is in my opinion not reduced 
by the sampling.  
 
Another concern worth discussing is the sample size. Patton emphasizes that ‘There are no 
rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry’ (2002:244). According to Lincoln & Cuba (1985), 
the researcher should aim at ‘informational redundancy’ and terminate the sampling when no 
new information is forthcoming. This sounds logical and it also often stated in methods 
sections of papers. I cannot say that this point was reached in our studies. But I can also not 
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say that it was not reached. In my opinion, to be sure that no new information is forthcoming, 
the researcher has to perform an ongoing textual analysis parallel to interviewing. 
Alternatively, she could, after a preliminary analysis, do some more interviews to see if the 
results are challenged or ‘confirmed’.  
 
After analyzing and then re-analyzing the 14 interviews from the first round (papers 1 and 2), 
I did not feel the need to go out for more information. Within the limits of the Intensity-
sampled group, there was a theoretical redundancy emerging from the analysis, as alluded 
above. For the last interview round (paper 3), only 11 of the prior participants were available. 
After this analysis, I did not have the same feeling of redundancy. I actually kept the 
possibility open that a few more interviews could have relieved yet another way of 
experiencing the phenomenon under study, and that would have added value to the study. On 
the other hand, our main point in that analysis was that in addition to the application of 
biomedical knowledge, other contexts of awareness are also important for the suspicion of 






This thesis aimed to explore GPs’ views of their contribution to health care for persons with 
cancer. Interviewing a group of GPs who seemed to be very dedicated to their work, we got a 
picture of what the contribution could be when general practice works at its best. The GP 
could be a doctor close a hand; proximate, accessible and available; being there for patients 
with cancer in a practical and supportive way. Reaching for the ideal of being such a doctor 
was seen as meaningful and challenging work. Palliative care was learnt through practice and 
experience as a GP seemed to increase professional self-confidence. Surprisingly, even very 
experienced GPs could have trouble getting access to a senior consultant for discussion when 
needed, and also have the feeling of possessing less important knowledge about the patient 
than their counterparts. In their diagnostic work, however, the GPs found their relational and 
contextual knowledge of patients useful. Such knowledge was a background for perceiving 
changes in the patients’ behaviour or wording that could allude to the possibility of malignant 
disease.  
 
An interpretation of this picture is that working with the diagnosis and care of people with 
cancer, combining biomedical and relational knowledge, might fulfil ideals of what it means 
to be a good GP; hence the perceived commitment, meaningfulness and loyalty. To 
understand GPs’ possible contribution to diagnosis and health care for people with cancer, the 
concepts of being a doctor close at hand, being a translator between everyday life and the 
clinic and being a supportive and touched companion through the course of illness might be 
helpful. These issues belong to a broader debate about goals, values and knowledge in 
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